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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
State capture involves the appropriation of state institutions,
organs, and functions by individuals or groups. By doing so, these
individuals and groups can have control over or influence the design
and adoption of new laws, rules, and regulations, as well as the
amendment or modification of existing ones.1 Ivor Chipkin2 argues
that state capture occurs when “state institutions, potentially
including the executive, state ministries, agencies, the judiciary and
the legislature, regulate their business to favor private interests.”3
It has been argued that state capture is a “severe form of
corruption.”4 Historically, corruption has been defined to include the
subversion of existing rules by civil servants and political elites to
generate extra-legal income for themselves.5 State capture, however,
*JOHN MUKUM MBAKU is Brady Presidential Distinguished Professor of
Economics & John S. Hinckley Research Fellow at Weber State University
(Ogden, Utah, USA). He is also a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., and an Attorney and Counselor at Law (licensed in
the State of Utah). He received a J.D. degree and Graduate Certificate in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law from the S.J. Quinney College of Law,
University of Utah, where he was Managing Editor of the Utah Environmental
Law Review, and a Ph.D. (economics) from the University of Georgia. This article
reflects only the present considerations and views of the author which should not
be attributed to either Weber State University or the Brookings Institution.
1.See, e.g., VESNA PESIC, STATE CAPTURE AND WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN
SERBIA 1 (Ctr. European Policy Studies Working Document No. 262, 2007),
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/state-capture-and-widespread-corruption-serbia
(defining “state capture” as “any group or social strata, external to the state, that
exercises decisive influence over state institutions and policies for its own interests
against the public good).
2. Ivor Chipkin, Corruption’s Other Scene: The Politics of Corruption in
South Africa, in GOVERNANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE:
MANAGEMENT AND STATE BUILDING 21 (Jonathan Murphy & Nimruji
Jammulamadaka eds., 2017).
3. Id. at 21.
4. Id. (explaining that the term “state capture” is an economic expression of
corruption).
5. See, e.g., Nathaniel. H. Leff, Economic Development Through
Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 8 (1964) (noting that
corruption is an “extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain
influence over the actions of the bureaucracy”); J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political
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implicates the taking over of “rule-making” and “rule-interpreting”
processes by private interests.6 Studies of state capture can help us
understand and more effectively appreciate the extent to which
“firms, and the networks which control them, have acquired the
ability to ‘shape the laws, policies and regulations . . . to their own
advantage by providing illicit private gains to officials.’”7
Once private interests capture it, the state ceases to operate in the
interest of the people. It functions and carries out its duties almost8
exclusively to maximize the interests of the private parties or agents
that have captured it. Why should citizens of a country be concerned
with state capture? In addition to abandoning its traditional functions,
which include providing necessary public goods and services (e.g.,
security of the person and property of the individual) to all citizens,
there may be a significant increase in government impunity, which
may include increased abuse of the fundamental rights of citizens,
especially those of historically marginalized and deprived individuals
and groups (e.g., women, girls, and religious and ethnic minorities),
increasing levels of corruption, especially of the grand type,
Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967)
(explaining that “corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)
pecuniary or status gains”); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption:
The Ghanaian Experience, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 71, 72-73 (1973) (referring to an
assumption that political parties are often motivated by “individual self-interest
and the possibilities of financial again”).
6. Chipkin, supra note 2, at 21.
7. Daniel C. Bach, State ‘Capture’ Without State Control: Regionalization
Through Trans-State Networks, in STATE, POWER, AND NEW POLITICAL ACTORS IN
POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA 235, 236 (Alessandro Triulzi & M. Cristina Ercolessi eds.,
2004).
8. See generally John Mukum Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth
Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 959 (2013) [hereinafter Mbaku, Providing a Foundation] (finding that the
extent to which the state neglects its obligations to the people is determined by
how fully and completely the state’s institutions have been captured by private
interests: In a country whose governing process is characterized by the separation
of powers (with effective checks and balances) and an executive that is captured by
private interests but a judiciary that remains independent, the government may still
be able to function on behalf of the people because the judiciary, using its powers
to determine the constitutionality of laws, can frustrate the ability of the executive
to engage in rule-making and rule-interpretations that favor certain business
interests).
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significant reductions in openness and transparency in government
communications, a deterioration in economic competitiveness as well
as in rule of law institutions (e.g., the courts), and a general failure of
the state to engage in necessary reforms to improve the country’s
institutional arrangements. Perhaps, more important, is the fact that
the state would no longer be interested in promoting those activities,
such as investment in formal and informal training for workers, that
can significantly improve the people’s ability to engage in activities
(e.g., entrepreneurship and the creation of wealth) that can greatly
enhance human development.9
In this paper, we will examine state capture with specific reference
to African countries. In Section II, we will revisit the definition of
state capture and provide a much more robust examination of the
concept and show how it differs from corruption. In Section III, we
explore state capture in Africa by drawing from the experiences of a
few countries. In Section IV, we explore the relationship between
state capture and the rule of law and how the former can significantly
impact the latter. In Section V, we examine the impact of state
capture on economic development. In Section VI, which is the
concluding section, we provide policy recommendations, and, in
doing so, we examine ways in which African countries can structure
their governing processes to minimize state capture and its
deleterious effects on governance generally and human development
in particular.

II. STATE CAPTURE AND CORRUPTION: A
GENERAL OVERVIEW
In the last several years, legal scholars,10 political scientists,11 and
9. See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS 103-04 (2007) [hereinafter MBAKU, CORRUPTION
IN AFRICA] (examining, inter alia, the impact of corruption on development in the
African countries); see generally JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (2004) [hereinafter MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND
DEVELOPMENT] (providing an analysis of the role of institutions in human
development in Africa); Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 977-78
(examining, inter alia, the important role played by the rule of law in wealth
creation and human development).
10. INT’L LEGAL CTR., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND
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economists, have recognized the fact that “corruption is
fundamentally a problem of governance.”12 Corruption is usually
pervasive in countries where civil servants and political elites are not
adequately constrained by the law and the state is either too weak or
unwilling to fully and effectively oversee the activities of public
employees.13 In such economies, there generally is an absence of
“institutions that underpin the rule of law.”14 Some scholars have
argued that the “recognition that corruption is a system of the
underlying weakness of the state, while important, has shifted the
focus of analysis away from firms.”15 But, why is an analysis of
corruption that takes a firm-level perspective important? Hellman, et
al.,16 argue that it is important because it provides researchers with
the opportunity to empirically examine “the efforts of firms to shape
and influence the underlying rules of the game (i.e., legislation, laws,
rules, and decrees) through private payments to public officials.”17
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 9 (1974) (presenting a series of essays that examine the
relationship between law and development); THEO SCHEEPERS, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW APPLICABLE TO DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT
PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA vii-viii (2000) (examining, inter alia, the legal aspects
of how to develop, implement, and manage development projects).
11. CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA vii-viii (1996)
(examining, inter alia, the causes of underdevelopment in Africa and presenting an
alternative paradigm for development in Africa); THE AFRICAN UNION AND NEW
STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 475-76 (Said Adejumobi & Adebayo
Olukoshi eds., 2008) (examining, inter alia, various development strategies
promoted by the African Union).
12. JOEL S. HELLMAN, GERAINT JONES, DANIEL KAUFMANN & MARK
SCHANKERMAN, MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND STATE CAPTURE:
HOW FIRMS AND BUREAUCRATS SHAPE THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 4 (European Bank Reconstruction & Dev. & World Bank
1999).
13. See, e.g., MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 9, at 102 (arguing
that, “unless Africans engage in the reconstruction of the state through democratic
constitution making to produce laws and institutions that significantly constrain the
ability of civil servants to impose operating roadblocks, opportunistic civil servants
are most likely to make them a permanent source of extralegal income for
themselves and their superiors”).
14. HELLMAN, JONES, KAUFMANN & SCHANKERMAN, supra note 12, at 4.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. This is actually the definition provided by these authors for “state
capture.” In practical terms, once the state is captured by private business interests,
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But what is the relationship between corruption and state capture?
Corruption usually refers to the activities of civil servants and
political elites that intentionally secure extra-legal income for these
individuals. For example, civil servants may extort payments from
individuals and private business firms that seek services from the
government. Businesses seeking import and production permits and
individuals demanding services such as a passport to travel abroad or
a government scholarship for their son or daughter to study abroad,
may be forced to pay bribes to civil servants in order to bypass what
they believe is an extremely onerous legal process for obtaining such
services.18
The available literature about corruption distinguishes between
grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers to the corrupt
activities of high-ranking civil servants and political elites which
involve large amounts of money and implicate efforts to influence
the latter effectively become de facto legislators, designing or influencing the
design of the laws that regulate socio-political interaction in the country. The
capture of the legislative process is usually undertaken through the provision of
illicit private gains to public officials, resulting in an effective corruption of the
governing process. See, e.g., Joel Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, Confronting the
Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies, 38 FIN. & DEV. 31, 31 (2001)
(defining state capture “as the efforts of firms to shape the laws, policies, and
regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit private gains to
public officials”).
18. See generally Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., An Analytical Perspective on
Police Corruption and Police Reforms in Developing Societies, in POLICE
CORRUPTION AND POLICE REFORMS IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 3, 11-13 (Kempe
Ronald Hope, Sr. ed., 2016) [hereinafter Hope, An Analytical Perspective on
Police Corruption] (discussing the forms of police corruption and the costs police
corruption imposes on society at large); Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., Corruption and
Development in Africa, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS
FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 17, 19-21 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell
C. Chikulo eds., 2000) [hereinafter Hope, Corruption and Development in Africa]
(discussing various factors contributing to ongoing corruption in Africa); Jacob
van Klaveren, The Concept of Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A
HANDBOOK 25, 25 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer et al. eds., 1989) (explaining that
corruption occurs in everyday life when a “civil servant abuses his authority to
obtain an extra income from the public”); VICTOR T. LE VINE, POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: THE GHANA CASE 6-7 (1975) (explaining that a politically corrupt
transaction “involves at least two people, at least one of them acting in an official
or quasi-official capacity, in an exchange in which a political good is passed in at
least one direction and at least one of the parties knows that the disposition of the
political good is unscheduled, illegal, or unsanctioned”).
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the public policy process. As argued by Arvind K. Jain,19 grand
corruption is “the acts of the political elite by which they exploit
their power to make economic policies.”20 Jain argues further that
“politicians [in a democratic political system] are supposed to make
resource allocation decisions based solely upon the interests of their
principal—the populace.”21 However, if a politician is corrupt, he or
she will act with impunity and engage in various “forms of
capriciousness and arbitrariness to maximize his private interests at
the expense of the society as a whole,”22 and, in doing so, will
engage in the promotion of policies that benefit the private business
interests that bribe the political elites.
Petty corruption (which is also referred to as “bureaucratic
corruption” or “administrative corruption”), involves “the corrupt
activities of the appointed bureaucrats in their dealings with either
their superiors (the political elite) or with the public.”23 Examples of
petty corruption abound in the African economies.24 For example, as
already mentioned, individuals and business firms that are seeking
access to public services may be forced to bribe civil servants in
order to make the services available. Generally, “the bribe is paid
either to ensure that the payor receives the service (to which he is
legally entitled), or to remove bottlenecks in the bureaucratic process
and enhance the ability of the payor to access the government
services, or to allow an individual who is not legally entitled to
receive a public service to do so.”25
19. Arvind K. Jain, Corruption: A Review, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 71 (2001).
20. Id. at 73.
21. Id.
22. John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and the Fight Against
Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 661, 683 (2016)
[hereinafter Mbaku, International Law] (discussing further the impact of bribes on
policies involving resource allocation).
23. Jain, supra note 19, at 75; see Mbaku, International Law, supra note 22, at
683.
24. Mbaku, International Law, supra note 22, at 683 (explaining that petty
corruption, for example, occurs when individuals and business firms seeking
access to services may be forced to pay bribes in order to receive services).
25. John Mukum Mbaku, Enhancing Africa’s Fight Against Corruption: The
Role of International Law, 3 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 9, 24 (2012) [hereinafter
Mbaku, Enhancing Africa’s Fight Against Corruption]. Note that some scholars
also refer to petty corruption as “administrative corruption.” E.g., Yahong Zhang &
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It is important to note that just because corruption is designated as
“petty” does not mean that its impact on the economy and its
citizens, especially the poor, is insignificant or benign. In fact, in
many countries on the African continent, petty corruption remains a
significant obstacle for people in organizing their private lives and
engaging in activities that create wealth and generally improve their
quality of life.26 This is especially true for people on the political and
economic margins and other historically vulnerable individuals and
groups (e.g., women, the urban poor, rural dwellers, and children). It
is often the case that the poor, unable to pay the bribes requested by
civil servants, are usually prevented from having access to welfareenhancing and, perhaps, life-saving services (e.g., clean water,
shelter, basic health care, food, and police protection).27
Several years ago, the World Bank developed the concept of “state
capture” to use as a tool to measure political instability in transition
economies, primarily in Eastern Europe.28 The World Bank defined
state capture as “the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in
the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws,
regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own
advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of
private benefits to public officials.”29 State capture, then, usually
involves the activities of corrupt political actors who “change the
regulations and institutions of the state in favor of their interests and
the interests of their political alliance and supporters.”30 Bureaucratic
corruption, however, refers to the provision of benefits to public
officials to influence how existing or established rules are

José G. Vargas-Hernández, Introduction: Corruption and Government AntiCorruption Strategies, in GOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES: A CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE xiii, xiv (Yahong Zhang & Cecilia Lavena eds., 2015).
26. Mbaku, International Law, supra note 22, at 683-84.
27. Id. at 684.
28. Zhang & Vargas-Hernández, supra note 25, at xiv.
29. WORLD BANK, ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE
POLICY DEBATE xv (2000) (emphasis in original).
30. Zhang & Vargas-Hernández, supra note 25, at xiii, xiv; see also Hellman &
Kaufmann, supra note 17, at 31 (referring to state capture as behavior of “oligarchs
manipulating policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the game to
their own, very substantial advantage”).
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implemented.31 If a private entrepreneur pays bribes to bureaucrats at
the Inland Revenue Service to lower the taxes that his business
enterprise legally owes the government, this is bureaucratic
corruption. However, if a group of business interests bribes public
officials to enact new legislation granting them monopoly control of
the importation of certain goods into the country, this is considered
part of the effort to capture the state.32
Where there is state capture, state institutions are no longer geared
toward serving the needs and interests of the people writ large, but
evolve into tools or mechanisms for the advancement of the interests
of specific individuals and groups—the latter are those who have
used illicit and non-transparent payments to secure control of rulemaking or legislative processes. Of the various types of corruption
that pervade any economy or political system, state capture is
considered the most insidious and the one with the greatest
transformational impact on the country because it can effectively
institutionalize bureaucratic and grand corruption, as well as
radically change the country’s laws and institutions.33
Thus, unlike most types of corruption, state capture can
fundamentally and radically transform the structure of the state and
the institutional foundation on which the state is built.34 In addition to
changes in the country’s laws and institutions, state capture can also
31. CHERYL GRAY, JOEL HELLMAN & RANDI RYTERMAN, ANTICORRUPTION IN
TRANSITION 2: CORRUPTION IN ENTERPRISE-STATE INTERACTIONS IN EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA 1999–2002 10 (World Bank 2004).
32. HELLMAN, JONES, KAUFMANN & SCHANKERMAN, supra note 12, at 20
(discussing “grand corruption” in which private payments are made to public
officials to influence legislation, rules, laws, or decrees).
33. See, e.g., S. I. COHEN, ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND POLICIES:
EXPLAINING GLOBAL DIFFERENCES, TRANSITIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 197 (2009)
(examining various typologies of corruption and showing that state capture is a
form of corruption); INT’L BUS. PUBL’NS, USA, UKRAINE INTELLIGENCE,
SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 20 (2006) (examining
corruption and showing that state capture is a form of corruption and “represents a
more severe threat to economic growth and foreign investment”).
34. See Akbar Noman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Strategies for African
Development, in GOOD GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 3, 21-22 (Akbar Noman et al. eds., 2012) (discussing
how deregulation, market liberalization, and privatization are susceptible to state
capture).
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lead to a radical restructuring of the relationship between the public
and private sectors—state custodians (that is, civil servants and
political elites) in a captured state may opt to engage in behaviors
that grant business interests a lot of benefits but which impose
significant costs on society at large. For example, politicians may
favor regulations that actually allow firms to pollute and damage the
ecosystem and, in the process, impose significant social and
economic costs on the people including, especially, the poor.35 State
capture can also radically change the relationship between
ethnocultural groups within the country, especially if some groups
are perceived as the primary and permanent beneficiaries of the
benefits generated through the capture process. In fact, ethnocultural
groups that perceive themselves as having been marginalized and
pushed to the economic and political margins by state capture may
resort to violent and destructive mobilization to minimize their
further exclusion and marginalization.36
35. See Mushtaq H. Khan, Governance and Growth: History, Ideology, and
Methods of Proof, in GOOD GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 51, 61 (Akbar Noman et al. eds., 2012).
36. For many years, the indigenous peoples of Liberia argued that the
government and the economy had been dominated and controlled by AmericoLiberians since the country’s founding in 1847. The Americo-Liberians are the
descendants of the freed American slaves who were brought to the area in the
1820s to establish the colony of Monrovia which eventually evolved into the
country that is now called Liberia. Various indigenous ethnocultural groups in
Liberia had argued for many years that the Americo-Liberian hegemony had
promoted public policies that enriched the latter but impoverished the former.
Thus, on April 12, 1980, when Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, a member of
the Krahn ethnocultural group, overthrew the government of William R. Tolbert,
an Americo-Liberian, Sergeant Doe argued that he had done so to end more than a
hundred years of the marginalization and infantilization of indigenous peoples. See
GEORGE KLAY KIEH, JR., THE FIRST LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR: THE CRISIS OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 18-19 (2008); JULIUS MUTWOL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND
CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS, STATE RESPONSES, AND
THIRD-PARTY PEACEMAKING IN LIBERIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 49-51
(2009). Other ethnocultural groups that have felt marginalized and pushed to the
margins of political and economic spaces have used similar arguments as those
employed by Liberia’s indigenous groups to engage or participate in violent and
destructive mobilization. For example, in 1994, the Hutus of Rwanda justified their
genocide against their fellow citizens (i.e., the Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers)
on the ground that they were fighting to prevent their further marginalization by a
government dominated by Tutsis. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS
BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 185-
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Public policy responses to market failures (e.g., environmental
pollution) are especially vulnerable to manipulation by public
officials in states that have been captured by private interests.37 For
example, governments can address environmental pollution (which
includes water, land, and air pollution) by (1) directly taxing the
polluting business; (2) providing the polluter with subsidies not to
pollute; (3) setting limits on emissions; or (4) making emissions
tradeable by creating well-defined property rights on them.38
Through one or more of these methods, the government can deal
effectively with pollution and minimize its deleterious costs on
society at large. However, where public officials have been captured
by private business interests, the former may simply ignore passing
legislation to implement any of these approaches to pollution control.
In doing so, public officials will allow polluting businesses to earn
non-competitive profits; nevertheless, society will be burdened with
the monetary and non-monetary costs of the pollution.39
There is a special type of state capture called “prebendal
predation,” which does not directly involve private business
interests.40 Within this system, which is created and directed by civil
servants (i.e., state bureaucrats), these civil servants use their official
positions to directly extract extra-legal income from citizens.
Specifically, civil servants, “organized in pyramidal prebends, [are]
able to extract resources from officials occupying a lower
hierarchical position. Going down the ladder, the lowest-placed
officials abusively [extract] bribes and illegal fees directly from
86 (2001).
37. Khan, supra note 35, at 61 (discussing the problems that can result from
policies seeking to correct specific market failures).
38. Id.
39. See ANDRÉ STANDING, CORRUPTION AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN
AFRICA: CAN COMBATTING CORRUPTION CURE THE RESOURCE CURSE? 12 (Inst.
Strategic Studies Paper No. 153, 2007) (providing that, in countries with weak
institutions and high levels of corruption “related to mining and oil production,”
costly interventions and community development programs may be less likely to
materialize); see generally PATRICK BOND, UNSUSTAINABLE SOUTH AFRICA:
ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROTEST 36 (2002) (providing that
pollution leads to increases in water treatment costs and public health risks to many
low-income households).
40. See generally PIERRE ENGLEBERT, AFRICA: UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
SORROW 81-84 (2009) (referring to the creation of “prebends” in corrupt societies).
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citizens.”41
In addition to the fact that all these types of state capture can
distort public policy and negatively affect the ability of the
government to provide citizens with public goods and services, state
capture can also create or exacerbate income and wealth inequalities
within the country.42 For example, where big business interests have
fully captured the state, legislatures will legislate primarily to meet
the interests of these businesses for monopoly profits. That process
would concentrate wealth in the hands of a few enterprise owners
and deprive the population at large from participating gainfully in
economic activities. Should such a process continue, it could lead to
significant deterioration in the quality of life and negatively affect
human development. In addition, with its control of the legislative
process, the business interest that has captured the state may not be
interested in using tax policy for redistributive purposes—
specifically, such business interest may actually make sure that the
government does not use tax policy to deal with poverty and improve
the quality of life for individuals and households on the economic
margins. One major development problem with state capture is that
the private business or corporate interests that take control of the
legislative process may not be interested in development-oriented
public policies—in fact, they may be violently hostile to such
policies since they may view them as obstacles to their ability to
monopolize economic spaces and continue to generate above normal
rates of return from their enterprises.43

41. CRISTINA CORDUNEANU-HUCI, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND ISSEL
MASSESS FERRER, UNDERSTANDING POLICY CHANGE: HOW TO APPLY POLITICAL
ECONOMY CONCEPTS IN PRACTICE 65 (2013).
42. See id. at 69-70 (“It may be the case that the existence of corruption further
entrenches inequality, as the rich and politically powerful are able to protect
themselves from the government . . . while more marginalized groups are less able
to prevent the abuse of public office for private gain.”).
43. See, e.g., AARON TESFAYE, STATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA 4-5 (2017) (arguing, inter alia, that some of the
corporate interests that have been involved in state capture “may not necessarily be
imbued with the ideology of development”).
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III. STATE CAPTURE IN AFRICA
A. INTRODUCTION
The classical theory of authority within a state identifies three key
groups, namely: (1) those who hold power—that is, the political
elite; (2) civil servants or bureaucrats; and (3) the people or
population.44 The principal-agent framework has emerged as a
mechanism to examine “how one group of actors—the principal—
contracts with another set of actors—the agents—to get things
done.”45 In any modern country, the population at large is the
principal and the political elite and the civil servants are the agents.
Within this model, the people (i.e., the principal) are interested
primarily in peace and security, the availability of certain public
goods and services (e.g., police protection, national defense) that
cannot be provided efficiently by the private market, and public
policies that support entrepreneurial activities and the creation of
wealth. The people form governments and empower them to
maintain law and order and provide them with other public goods
and services (e.g., social overhead capital—roads, schools, hospitals,
public parks, and libraries), as well provide them with an institutional
environment within which they can create the wealth that they need
to meet their basic needs and improve their quality of life. In
exchange, the individuals who perform these governmental functions
(i.e., the agents) are provided decent compensation by the principal.46
Of course, the principal is quite concerned about the possibility
that the agent could become opportunistic and engage in self-dealing
or act with impunity for his own benefit instead of that of the
principal. Thus, within such an institutional arrangement, the
principal is continuously worried about how to select, monitor,
supervise, and if necessary, discipline agents. One form of
opportunism on the part of agents is total oppression of the principal
by the agents—here, the agents set themselves up as “masters” and
44. See generally 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 215-25 (Guenter Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978)
(describing types of authority).
45. JAN-ERIK LANE, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PERSPECTIVE 1 (2008).
46. Id. at 6.
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proceed to treat the people or principal as slaves.47 The agents would
then extract as much value from the principal as possible, for
example, through either confiscatory taxes or some form of tax
farming—both are likely to involve the excessive use of force. This
situation is what usually obtains in a captured state.48
Another form of opportunism by agents can involve the
subjugation or oppression of, not the entire population, but of certain
groups within the country. Some groups are treated harshly for the
benefit of the agents and a few favored groups. The surplus value
extracted from the marginalized groups is shared between the agents
and the favored groups. This model of agent opportunism describes
South Africa’s apartheid system (1948–1994) and the political
system that was established in Liberia in 1847.49
In the case of state capture, the agents can use tax farming or
confiscatory taxes to extract value from the economy for themselves
and favored groups—the latter are usually the business interests that
have captured the state. Agents may prefer tax farming to direct
taxation in countries, such as those in Africa, where governments do
not have full control of national territory,50 corruption is rampant,
and high rates of illiteracy and other problems make it very difficult
for the government to accurately determine household income.51
47. Id. at 3.
48. See id. at 3–5.
49. Under the apartheid system, whites were the favored population and the
Africans were the marginalized and exploited population. In Liberia, the AmericoLiberians were the favored population and the indigenous groups were the
exploited and marginalized groups. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON,
WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN
HISTORY 239-41 (1981) (providing an overview of racial segregation and the
marginalization of Africans in South Africa and the United States); Minion K. C.
Morrison, Prologue to LIBERIAN POLITICS: THE PORTRAIT BY AFRICAN AMERICAN
DIPLOMAT J. MILTON TURNER xxvii, xxxvii (Hanes Walton, Jr. et al. eds., 2002)
(describing how the Liberian government maintained an undemocratic government
at the expense of indigenous ethnocultural groups).
50. This could be due, for example, to the lack of infrastructure, including,
especially, roads and bridges. Metin M. Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, Tax
Collection in History, ECON. WORKING PAPERS 7, 10-11 (2007).
51. See KIBUTA ONGWAMUHANA, TAX COMPLIANCE IN TANZANIA: ANALYSIS
OF LAW AND POLICY AFFECTING VOLUNTARY TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 16 (2011)
(explaining the issue through the lens of taxation).
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At the other end of the spectrum, however, the state is wellconstrained by the law, agents (i.e., civil servants and political elites)
accept and respect the law, do not engage in self-dealing, do not act
arbitrarily, capriciously, or with impunity, and work to maximize the
interests of the principal (i.e., the people). Agents are fully
accountable to the constitution and the people, and, because they do
not have the opportunity and wherewithal to engage in corruption
and other forms of opportunism, they would rather demand that the
people pay them decent and competitive compensation packages than
engage in self-aggrandizing activities. Adherence to the rule of law is
a major characteristic of governance in such a polity. While business
interests may still try to capture the state, they are less likely to
succeed because civil servants and political elites accept and respect
the law and are not likely to cooperate with those who attempt to
corrupt them.52
In this section, we examine state capture in Africa by drawing
examples from a few African countries. Although many social
scientists have considered African countries, such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), as failed states—that is, states that are
characterized by their “inability or unwillingness to protect their
citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction, as well as their
tendency to consider themselves beyond the reach of domestic or
international law,” and “hence free to carry out aggression and
violence”53—these states remain quite efficient when it comes to the
protection of the interests of ruling elites and their economic or
commercial partners or benefactors.
In the case of the DRC, for example, while it is quite clear that the
state in Kinshasa has failed to provide the majority of Congolese
citizens with basic services—security, including police protection;
education; health care; clean water; and opportunities for self52. See generally Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 964
(examining, inter alia, why the rule of law is critical to wealth creation and human
development).
53. NOAM CHOMSKY, FAILED STATES: THE ABUSE OF POWER AND THE
ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY 1-2 (2007); see also ROBERT H. BATES, WHEN THINGS
FELL APART: STATE FAILURE IN LATE-CENTURY AFRICA 137-39 (2008)
(commenting on the give-and-take between security and prosperity within failed
states).
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actualization (which may include, for example, maintenance of a safe
institutional environment within which citizens can engage in
entrepreneurial activities to create wealth for themselves)— it is
quite clear that the same state has provided the wherewithal for
private business interests, particularly the foreign multinational
companies that are active in the natural resources extraction sector,
to maximize their objectives. These objectives include the extraction
and sale of the country’s natural resources without adequate
compensation to the people of the DRC.54 As far back as the time of
colonialism, various commercial and business interests have
successfully captured governing institutions in Congo and have
proceeded to act with impunity expressly for the purpose of
extracting the territory’s natural resources for the benefit of the
private interests, as well as for the security of the regime—for
example, during colonialism, the colonial regime and in the postindependence period, the regimes of Mobutu Sese Seko and those of
the two Kabilas (Joseph Kabila and his father, Laurent-Désiré
Kabila).55
In Guinea, the state has been captured by several mining
interests.56 Guinea is one of Africa’s poorest countries and the
international community has accused many of its public officials of
receiving bribes to sell the country’s natural resources, including the
Simandou Mines, the world’s richest and largest deposits of iron-ore,
to foreign interests at below market prices.57 Before he died in office
54. NATALIE RALPH, PEACEMAKING AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES:
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE PEACE 66-68 (2015); Mungbalemwe
Koyame & John F. Clark, The Economic Impact of the Congo War, in THE
AFRICAN STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR 201, 207-09 (John F. Clark ed., 2002).
55. See FRANÇOIS NGOLET, CRISIS IN THE CONGO: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LAURENT KABILA 233-34 (2010) (depicting the looting of Congo’s natural
resources); GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO FROM LEOPOLD TO
KABILA: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY 150-52, 238-39 (2002) (describing, inter alia,
Mobutu’s profiteering); DAVID RENTON ET AL., THE CONGO: PLUNDER &
RESISTANCE 1-2 (2007) (explaining the impacts of Western colonialism in Congo).
56. ANDREI PANIBRATOV, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY OF EMERGING MARKET
FIRMS: ABSORBING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE AND BUILDING COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE 228 (2017).
57. IFEDAPO ADELEYE ET AL., THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN AFRICA (2015); GREGORY R. COPLEY, DEFENSE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HANDBOOK 616 (1999); PANIBRATOV, supra note 56, at 228.
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in 2008, President Lansana Conté agreed to hand over a license
worth billions of pounds sterling to mine a share of the Simandou
Mines to BSG Resources (BSGR), a company based in the British
Crown dependency of Guernsey and which actually belonged to
Israeli diamond magnate Beny Steinmetz. In exchange, BSGR
pledged to invest a mere $165 million to develop the two blocks (out
of four blocks) of the Simandou Mines that had been granted to the
company by President Conté—the other two blocs (or 50%) were left
with Rio Tinto, which had purchased the entire concession many
years earlier.
The international community questioned the deal and critics called
Guinean officials idiots and criminals for making a deal that
represented the giving away of valuable Guinean resources with
virtually no returns to the people.58 That the concessions granted to
BSGR were very valuable is evidenced by the fact that shortly after it
received the license from the Guinean authorities, BSGR sold 51%
of the license to the Brazilian company Vale for $2.5 billion. Rio
Tinto later sold 46.6% of its stake in the Simandou Mines to
Chinalco, a Hong Kong-based mining company, for $1.3 billion.59
The various natural resource deals in Guinea represented a form of
tax farming made possible by a state that had been captured by
foreign business interests in exchange for bribes to the country’s
senior public officials. While the mass of Guinean citizens continued
to swelter in poverty, the country’s political elites were reaping
significant personal benefits from the sale of licenses to exploit the
country’s natural resources.60 For example, after the release of the
Panama Papers, it was revealed that Mamadie Touré, the wife of
President Conté, had agreed to “do everything necessary in order to
obtain the signature from the authorities for the mining area in

58. BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE PANAMA PAPERS:
BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH AND POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY 20203 (2016).
59. IMF, Guinea: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Joint Staff Advisory
Note para. 32 (Apr. 2013); YUSUF BANGURA, DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS TO
POVERTY REDUCTION 26 (2015); OBERMAYER & OBERMAIER, supra note 58, at
202.
60. OBERMAYER & OBERMAIER, supra note 58, at 204-5.
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question for the company BSG Resources Guinea”61 in exchange for
various illicit payments. In addition, within a short time after
Mamadie Touré became involved in facilitating the deal, her brother
was hired as a VP with BSGR and the latter was awarded the
Simandou license by the government of Guinea.62
Many other African countries besides Guinea and the Democratic
Republic of Congo have suffered from state capture. These include,
for example, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, Liberia,
and South Sudan.63 In this section, we shall discuss only two
situations—the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa.64

B. STATE CAPTURE IN AFRICA:
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
From Belgium’s King Leopold II65 more than a hundred years ago
to Mobutu66 and the Kabilas,67 a close alliance of private business
61. Id. at 204.
62. Id. at 205.
63. SAMUEL MONDAYS ATUOBI, CORRUPTION AND STATE INSTABILITY IN
WEST AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF POLICY OPTIONS 2-3, 7, 12 (2007); Michaela
Elsbeth Martin & Hussein Solomon, Understanding the Phenomenon of “State
Capture” in South Africa, 5 SOUTHERN AFR. PEACE & SECURITY STUD. 21, 21
(2016).
64. YUSUF BANGURA, DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND COHESION: CRITICAL
ESSAYS WITH INSIGHTS ON SIERRA LEONE AND WIDER AFRICA CONTEXTS 334,
344-49 (2015); SASHA JESPERSON, RETHINKING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT
NEXUS: ORGANIZED CRIME IN POST-CONFLICT STATES (2017).
65. See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF
GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 1-4 (1999) (providing an
overview of the impact of King Leopold’s exploits on colonial Congo and the
DRC); JOHN DE COURCY MACDONNELL, KING LEOPOLD II: HIS RULE IN BELGIUM
AND THE CONGO 5, 7 (Argosy-Antiquarian 1970) (1905) (providing an overview of
the life of King Leopold II and his exploits in the Congo).
66. See generally RICHARD GOTT, MOBUTU’S CONGO 1-2 (1968) (providing an
overview of Mobutu Sese Seko and the impact of his rule on the DRC).
67. Mobutu Sese Seko seized power from Joseph Kasavubu in a military coup
in 1965 and ruled the country until he was forced out of office by Laurent-Désiré
Kabila. The latter was assassinated by one of his bodyguards in 2001. He was
succeeded a few days later by his son, Joseph Kabila, who remains the president of
DRC to this day (2018). See generally DAVID RENTON ET AL., THE CONGO:
PLUNDER & RESISTANCE 201 (2007) (describing how leaders have exchanged
power in Congo throughout history); TOM BURGIS, THE LOOTING MACHINE:
WARLORDS, TYCOONS, SMUGGLERS AND THE SYSTEMATIC THEFT OF AFRICA’S
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interests and political elites has taken control of the Congolese state
and has been able to use its position to steal billions of dollars’ worth
of resources belonging to the Congolese people. Each successive
regime, beginning with that which was forcefully imposed by King
Leopold’s colonial officers to Joseph Kabila’s rule, has formed
partnerships with private business and commercial interests, most of
them foreign, to defraud Congolese citizens of resources for poverty
alleviation and human development.68
In a 2016 plea agreement in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) case brought against New York based Och-Ziff Capital
Management Group LLC (Och-Ziff) by the U.S. Department of
Justice, the company admitted to its role in conspiracies to bribe
public officials in several African countries, including the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).69 Och-Ziff officials admitted
that some of the company’s business partners, including Israeli
businessman Dan Gertler, paid over $100 million to public officials
in the DRC in order to obtain billions of dollars’ worth of natural
resources concessions at extremely low prices.70
Studies of political economy in the DRC have isolated several
important “pillars” that undergird the history of the country’s unique
form of state capture, which has been referred to as “violent
WEALTH 37 (2015) (detailing how Congolese leaders have plundered the country’s
natural resources).
68. See generally CORDUNEANU-HUCI, HAMILTON & FERRER, supra note 41, at
65-66 (depicting Congo as a kleptocracy).
69. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Och-Ziff Capital Management Admits
to Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal
Fine
(Sept.
29,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/och-ziff-capitalmanagement-admits-role-africa-bribery-conspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213
(last
visited Aug. 14, 2017); Plea Agreement, Exhibit 3: Statement of Facts, at 6, United
States v. OZ Africa Mgmt. Grp., LLC, No. 16-515 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/899316/download.
70. Jon Yeomans, Glencore Paid $100m to Dan Gertler in Congo Deals,
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
business/2017/03/03/glencore-paid-100m-dan-gertler-congo-deals/;
see
also
HOUSE OF COMMONS INT’L DEV. COMM., WORKING EFFECTIVELY IN FRAGILE AND
CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES: DRC AND RWANDA, 2010-12, HC 1133, at Ev. 20
(UK); JAMES KAZONGO, DRC: RICHEST AND POOREST COUNTRY (2016); NONSTATE CHALLENGES IN A RE-ORDERED WORLD: THE JACKALS OF WESTPHALIA 6869 (Stefano Ruzza et al. eds., 2016) (describing bribery and extortion in Congo).
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kleptocracy.”71 First, in order to ensure their monopolization of
legislation and minimize any chances of a military overthrow of their
regimes, successive Congolese leaders have usually practiced a form
of “tax farming”72 where various geographic areas of the country are
placed under the control of military commanders. The military
commanders then exploit the resources and peoples of their “land
concessions” for their benefit and that of the ruler.73 The exploitation
of the resources of each concession is carried out through alliances
with private (mostly foreign) businesses.74 In this type of state
capture, private business interests usually do not seek to control the
national legislative process, but concentrate on legislation as it
affects the specific geographic region where their activities are
concentrated. With respect to the DRC, the relationship between the
business oligarch and the military commander in charge of the region
is critical to the successful exploitation of the mineral resources. Of
course, the oligarchs, most of whom are foreigners, worry about the
71. Sasha Lezhnev, A Criminal State: Understanding and Countering
Institutionalized Corruption and Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
ENOUGH (Oct. 27, 2016), https://enoughproject.org/reports/criminal-stateunderstanding-and-countering-institutionalized-corruption-and-violence-democr.
72. CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE
COURSE OF CIVILIZATION 70-72 (2nd ed. 1999); see also BRIAN DAVIES, EMPIRE
AND MILITARY REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE: RUSSIA’S TURKISH WARS IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 176 (2011) (describing similar military-tax set-ups).
73. In modern Congo, Mobutu Sese Seko, (1965–1997), Laurent-Désiré Kabila
(1997–2001), and Joseph Kabila (2001–present). See generally AFRICAN
FRONTIERS: INSURGENCY, GOVERNANCE AND PEACEBUILDING IN POSTCOLONIAL
STATES 26-27 (John Idriss Lahai & Tanya Lyons eds., 2015) (suggesting that
violence can stem from natural resourse control); ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE
TROUBLED HEART OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF THE CONGO xi-xii (2002) (explaining
how Congo’s leaders stole the nation’s resources); GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA,
FROM ZAIRE TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 16-17 (2004)
(commenting on businesses, leaders, and the military in relation to natural
resources).
74. ABIODUN ALAO, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE
TRAGEDY OF ENDOWMENT 278-80 (2007); VIRGIL HAWKINS, STEALTH CONFLICTS:
HOW THE WORLD’S WORST VIOLENCE S IGNORED 149-50 (2008); GAVIN M.
HILSON, THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE
MINING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2006); Michael Renner, Violent Mining
Conflicts and Diamond Wars, in THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ARTISANAL
AND SMALL-SCALE M INING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 81, 95-96 (Gavin M.
Hilson ed., 2006).
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policies of the central government in Kinshasa, especially as they
relate to their safety within the country and the transmission of
information about their activities within the DRC to international
governmental and non-governmental organizations (e.g., the U.S.
Department of Justice’s FCPA enforcement arm)75 that might
prosecute them for violating certain international laws.
Of course, the business oligarchs who engage in the illegal
exploitation of natural resources in various provinces in the DRC are
aware that the central government in Kinshasa is unlikely to betray
them and the generals that provide them protection for at least three
reasons: (1) Kinshasa depends on the generals that administer the
various provinces and hence provide security for the exploitation of
the mineral resources which generate the illicit payments that form
the bulk of their extra-legal income; (2) the military elites who rule
the various geographic concessions within the country have the
violence potential to overthrow the government in Kinshasa; and (3)
the multinational companies and their owners are an important input
in the generation of the revenues that flow to the central government.
Thus, for purposes of regime survival and the continued flow of
extra-legal income from the provinces to the center, Kinshasa is not
likely to betray provincial benefactors including the various business
interests that have captured the governing structures in these

75. Where the foreign business executive operating in the DRC, for example, is
suspected of engaging in practices that violate the United States’ Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), such as bribing foreign public officials in international
business transactions, the U.S. Department of Justice might seek information from
the government in Kinshasa in order to determine whether these activities fall
within the jurisdiction of the FCPA and whether there is enough information to
proceed with prosecution of the alleged violations. Alternatively, international nongovernmental organizations, such as Global Witness, might be interested in
investigating and exposing the corrupt activities of such oligarchs and cooperation
of the government in Kinshasa can be very critical in such investigations. Hence,
any multinational company engaged in such unscrupulous activities in the DRC
must be concerned about cooperation between the government in Kinshasa and
foreign actors (which may include governmental and non-governmental
institutions) that could create legal problems for them. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N ENF’T DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE
TO
THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 20-21 (2012),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
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regions.76
It is claimed that in a speech in the 1980s to his soldiers who were
complaining about unpaid salaries, Mobutu declared as follows:
“You have guns; you don’t need a salary.”77 During the life of
Mobutu’s regime and that of the Kabilas, the fear of assassination of
political elites, including the president, and threats to the security of
the regime enhanced the ability of top military commanders to
engage in illicit mining and resource extraction as well as extort
resources from Congolese civilians with the acquiescence of Mobutu
and the Kabilas.78 Thus, the country’s military commanders and their
foreign business partners have, through capturing the Congolese
state, become the de facto policy makers in the country.79 Of course,
military commanders and the foreign entrepreneurs who receive
billions of dollars’ worth of lucrative mining concessions at
extremely low prices are not the only ones who are getting rich; the
president and other political elites are also enriching themselves. The
victims of this violent kleptocracy are the Congolese people, who are
sweltering in poverty in a country endowed with huge amounts of
natural resources.80
Each regime in the DRC, whether colonial or post-independence,
has used violence to destroy the opposition and ensure its survival. In
fact, the methods used by Joseph Kabila to crush the opposition are
not that different from those employed by earlier regimes, including

76. Since the time of King Leopold II, the brutal Belgian colonialist who set
the standard for the exploitation of the DRC’s national wealth, the country’s
natural resource endowments have been monopolized by its political and military
elites and their foreign business partners while the masses have remained trapped
in a vicious cycle of poverty and material deprivation. See KEVIN C. DUNN,
IMAGINING THE CONGO: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF IDENTITY 45-47
(2003); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 65, at 301-04; NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note
55, at 20-22.
77. JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE
OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 116 (2012).
78. See Theodore Trefon, Congo’s Environmental Catch-22, in IN PURSUIT OF
PROSPERITY: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ERA OF NATURAL RESOURCE SCARCITY
191, 194-95 (David Reed ed., 2015).
79. PAUL ROBERT BARTROP, A BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDE: PORTRAITS OF EVIL AND GOOD 151 (2012).
80. ALAO, supra note 74, at 23-25.
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those of Mobutu, the senior Kabila,81 and King Leopold II—
”intimidation, repression, and violence to quash dissent, democratic
aspirations, and the influence of rival elites.”82 This is a pillar of the
DRC’s unique form of state capture—violent kleptocracy.83
A captured state is usually characterized by the absence of
openness and transparency, as well as accountability to both the
constitution and the people. In addition to opacity in government
communications, senior government officials are not held
accountable for their actions. They can act with impunity and the
government only pretends to care about corruption cleanups.84 The
state in the Democratic Republic of Congo is no exception. There is
an absence of accountability, the country’s existing legal system
enhances impunity by high-ranking officials, including the president,
sexual violence against women and girls is pervasive, and the
government only pretends to care about corruption control.85 For
example, the World Bank argues that “for state institutions to be
inclusive, they first have to be effective, accountable, and
representative.”86 Inclusion, accountability, and representation, the
World Bank argues, cannot take place in a state that has been
81. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, father of Joseph Kabila, and the 3rd president of the
DRC. He overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko on May 17, 1997. He was later
assassinated by one of his bodyguards on January 16, 2001. Eight days following
Laurent-Désiré’s assassination, his son, Joseph, became president of the DRC. See
generally Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, Rethinking State Formation and the PostColonial Political Experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in
RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE IN AFRICA 54, 99-100 (George
Klay Kieh, Jr. & Pita Ogaba Agbese eds., 2013); Trefon, supra note 78, at 192-95;
THOMAS TURNER, THE CONGO WARS: CONFLICT, MYTH AND REALITY 190 (2007).
82. See Lezhnev, supra note 71.
83. See, e.g., JEANNE M. HASKIN, THE TRAGIC STATE OF THE CONGO: FROM
DECOLONIZATION TO DICTATORSHIP 52 (2005).
84. See Democratic Republic of Congo: Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 10, 2014, 1:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2014/06/10/democratic-republic-congo-ending-impunity-sexual-violence (stating
that impunity has included rape and other forms of sexual violence against women
and girls, as well as various types of human rights abuses).
85. KEVIN BALES, BLOOD AND EARTH: MODERN SLAVERY, ECOCIDE, AND THE
SECRET TO SAVING THE WORLD 32-34 (2016); RAYMOND M. NGOMA, TRAPPED IN
THE CONGO DRAMA 58-59, 116-17 (2013).
86. WORLD BANK, MAKING TRANSITION WORK FOR EVERYONE: POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY IN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 186 (2000) (emphasis added).
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captured.87 Within such a state, the business interests that have
captured the state will ensure that the legislative process cannot be
used to build and sustain “inclusive state institutions” and, as a
result, accountability and inclusiveness are likely to be missing from
the political system.88
Joseph Kabila, as well as other presidents before him, has
intentionally created divisions in the armed forces in order to
minimize the threat of a coup d’état.89 The Congolese military under
Joseph Kabila, for example, is “divided and disorganized,”90 a
situation that has made it very difficult for peace and security to be
maintained. The Forces Armées de la République démocratique du
Congo (the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)
currently consists of a blending of “Mobutu’s Forces Armées
Zaïroises with Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) troops, including the
Kadogo child soldiers, as well as remnants of the Katangese Tigers,
soldiers from Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC and from the Rally for
Congolese Democracy (RCD)-Goma, who were integrated during the
2003–2006 transition, as well as members from many rebel
groups.”91 As a result, the DRC has not been able to develop a
professional army corps and this works quite well for Kabila and
other political elites in the DRC who use the patchwork of
conflicting military units to ensure their continued monopolization of
the country’s political economy.92
Within a captured state, public officials and their private business
partners usually take advantage of their control of legislation to
maximize the benefits flowing to them from the economy. These
private firms use their new-found power to “block any policy
reforms that might eliminate [the] advantages” they enjoy.93 In
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Kisangani N. F. Emizet, Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes:
Civil-Military Relations in the Congo, 26 ARMED FORCES & SOC. 203, 216 (2000).
90. Lezhnev, supra note 71.
91. Id.
92. ARTUR USANOV ET AL., COLTAN, CONGO AND CONFLICT 64-65 (Hague Ctr.
Strategic Studies 2013).
93. See Hellman & Kaufmann, supra note 17, at 31.
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captured states of countries with relatively weak institutions and
which have significant endowments of natural resources, such as the
DRC, public officials usually farm out the exploitation of the
country’s resources to private, primarily foreign, business interests
and, in exchange, they receive illicit payments from these firms. This
form of grand corruption is quite pervasive in the DRC and has been
so since the time of King Leopold II.94 The companies that exploit
the resources and the senior public officials in Kabila’s DRC, like
those in previous regimes (e.g., that of Mobutu’s), have agreed on a
system of opaque contracting where the private firms have complete
control of the natural resource exploitation process (e.g., mining),
with the protection of various army units, and, in exchange, senior
political and military elites, including the president, receive regular
payments that include money from trade in natural resources and
“unofficial taxes, fees, and bribes.”95
Captured states usually underspend on public goods and
services—in fact, in some cases, the state may not supply services to
large parts of the population, preferring instead to favor groups (e.g.,
senior civilian and military elites) who are members of the inner
cycle of the kleptocracy. For example, in the DRC, while the
president maintains a large cabinet and spends lavishly on himself,
his family, and his inner circle of supporters,96 very little money is
94. See MATTHEW G. STANARD, SELLING THE CONGO: A HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN PRO-EMPIRE PROPAGANDA AND THE MAKING OF BELGIAN IMPERIALISM
30 (2011) (finding that Leopold declared “monopolies on all raw materials,
confiscated all ‘vacant’ lands in the Congo, granted huge concessions to European
companies, prohibited Africans from selling goods such as elephant tusks to
private traders, began to extract ivory and natural rubber, and taxed exports”); see
generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 65, at 304 (explaining that Leopold took
advantage of his privately controlled state and did not share the profits with
anyone); JULES MARCHAL, LORD LEVERHULME’S GHOSTS: COLONIAL
EXPLOITATION IN THE CONGO 1 (Martin Thom trans., Verso 2008) (emphasizing
that the Belgian Congo government regarded all land in the early 1900s as state
property); MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE:
LEOPOLD II, THE CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 89 (2002)
(demonstrating that Leopold created an area, Domaine de la Couronne, to exploit
as private property); NEAL ASCHERSON, THE KING INCORPORATED: LEOPOLD II IN
THE AGE OF TRUSTS 110 (1963) (showing that a Belgian banker Lambert
represented Leopold in financial acquisitions).
95. E.g., Lezhnev, supra note 71, at 47.
96. See generally CONGO RESEARCH GRP., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WEALTH:
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allocated to primary and secondary education and health care.
Furthermore, the government has not invested substantially in the
provision of necessary infrastructure for economic growth and
development.97 During the last several years, the Kabila government
has publicly announced several institutional reform efforts, but these
efforts have not been designed to improve governance, but rather to
help the country avoid being labelled a pariah state by the
international community.98 Such a label could bring sanctions against
the country’s leaders, prevent them from having access to the
international financial system, as well as make it difficult for them to
travel abroad. All of the DRC’s post-independence regimes have
manipulated institutional reforms to punish their opponents, enhance
their ability to remain in power, and provide laws that are favorable
to their business partners.99
Finally, public policy in a captured state, as it is in Kabila’s DRC,
THE KABILA FAMILY BUSINESS (2017), https://allthewealth.congoresearch
group.org/dist/assets/all-the-presidents-wealth-ENG.pdf
(providing
more
information on Joseph Kabila’s family wealth).
97. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-1030, THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE MINERALS
TRADE IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 4 (2010),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101030.pdf (arguing, inter alia, that the lack of
infrastructure will render impossible the effective monitoring and regulation of the
mineral trade in the DRC); see also JOHANNES HERDERSCHEE ET AL., RESILIENCE
OF AN AFRICAN GIANT: BOOSTING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 65 (World Bank 2012), http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/986871468243586272/pdf/648210PUB0Resi0C0disclos
ed010050110.pdf (examining, inter alia, how the lack of infrastructure causes
“geographic and economic isolation” for many regions of the DRC).
98. See CH. DIDIER GONDOLA, THE HISTORY OF CONGO 152 (2002) (remarking
that in the early 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF considered the DRC as a
“pariah state” and, as a consequence, the country lost its credibility in the “eyes of
most of its lending partners,” while also showing that throughout its existence as a
sovereign state, the state in the DRC has never served “any socially meaningful
purpose that could promote the interests, however[] defined, of the Zaïrian people[;
rather] it exists, to the extent to which it exists at all, to enrich and empower the
small group that controls it,” and during his more than thirty years in power,
Mobutu Sese Seko “pilfered the nation’s wealth, encouraged by the interests of
Western powers”).
99. See Lezhnev, supra note 71, at 58 (listing extractive companies that are
operating in the DRC).
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is usually characterized by confusion and uncertainty. This may be
due to government incompetence, weak capacity, or, as argued by
many researchers in the case of the DRC, deliberate action by the
regime to enhance their ability to stay in power as well as engage in
non-transparent resource extraction deals that allow the elites to
generate extra-legal income for themselves.100
The Democratic Republic of Congo is not a failed state;101 instead,
it is a captured state in which the public policy process has been
taken over by private business interests and is being used to benefit
the country’s civilian and military elites as well as various
commercial interests. Hence, from the point of view of the country’s
senior level civil and military elites, as well as the entrepreneurial
interests that bribe these public officials, the government in Kinshasa
is quite efficient—it provides them with all the services that they
need to operate freely in the DRC.

C. STATE CAPTURE IN AFRICA: THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
1. South Africa: A Long History of State Capture
Since the four colonies—the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the
100. See LOUIS PUTZEL ET AL., CHINESE TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND THE
FORESTS OF THE CONGO BASIN: SYNTHESIS OF SCOPING STUDIES IN CAMEROON,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND GABON vii (Ctr. Int’l Forestry Research
Working Paper 67, 2011) (noting that one such deal is the $6.2 billion “mineralsfor-infrastructure” deal between Sicomine, which is a consortium of Chinese
companies, and the Congolese government); see also JOHANNA JANSSON, THE
SICOMINES AGREEMENT: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5-6 (S. Afr. Inst. Int’l Affairs,
2011) (concluding through an opaque process that it has been difficult for
researchers to determine the terms of the “minerals-for-infrastructure” deal,
especially regarding what the responsibilities of the Chinese firms are, and
perhaps, more importantly is what the roles of the various Congolese parastatals
are, as well as who, the Chinese firms or the Congolese government, is responsible
for environmental cleanup and ecosystem restoration once mineral extraction is
completed).
101. See MATTHEW BUKOVAC, FAILED STATES: UNSTABLE COUNTRIES IN THE
21ST CENTURY 4 (2011) (quoting that a failed state is a country “where the
government has failed at its basic responsibilities” to infer that while the DRC may
be considered a failed state because it no longer provides basic services to the
general population, it is not a failed state because it is quite effective when it
comes to the provision of services to a select part of the population).
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Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony—transformed themselves
into the Union of South Africa in 1910 through the South Africa Act
(9 Edward VII, c.9),102 state capture has been an integral part of
governance in South Africa. For example, immediately after the
Union of South Africa came into being in 1910, the Union
government, working with its business partners, proceeded to use
legislation to exploit the country’s majority African population for
the benefit of governing elites, the minority white population, and
business owners, including especially Afrikaner farmers and English
mining interests.103 Specifically, the government passed a series of
laws to establish what came to be known as the Industrial Color
Bar104—the government designed these segregationist laws to protect
white labor against competition from Africans. The Union
102. South Africa Act of 1909 § 9 (S. Afr.) (serving as the new country’s
constitution and showing that the British Parliament granted independence to four
colonies).
103. See Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 (S. Afr.). Subsequently renamed the
Bantu Land Act, 1913/Black Land Act, 1913, illustrating that, as the first major
piece of segregationist legislation enacted by the new Union Parliament, the Act
was designed to regulate the acquisition and utilization of land in the country and it
came to represent an important pillar of the apartheid system that was officially
established in 1948, while further showing that the Act prohibited whites from
purchasing land from Africans and the latter from purchasing land from the former,
and initially, the Act limited African land ownership to a mere 10 percent of the
total land mass of the country, which was eventually expanded to 13 percent. See
HARVEY M. FEINBERG, OUR LAND, OUR LIFE, OUR FUTURE: BLACK SOUTH
AFRICAN CHALLENGES TO TERRITORIAL SEGREGATION, 1913–1948 156 (2015)
(evaluating the role that the 1913 Natives Land Act played in territorial segregation
in the Union of South Africa and beyond); see generally ARRIGO PALLOTTI & ULF
ENGEL, SOUTH AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID: POLICIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 2 (2016) (examining, inter alia, the continuing impact of
apartheid-era laws on South Africans, especially those who were subjected to the
country’s segregationist policies).
104. GEORGE V. DOXEY, THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR IN SOUTH AFRICA 127
(1961); see also WILLIAM H. HUTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR 58
(1964) (listing some of these laws); see generally Mines and Works Act of 1911
(S. Afr.) (permitting competency certificates for a number of skilled mining
occupations); Mines and Works Amendment Act 25 of 1926 (S. Afr.) (re-enacting
the 1911 Mines and Works Act); Minimum Wages Act of 1925 (S. Afr.) (initiating
a form of job reservation which promotes employment for white people); Industrial
Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 (S. Afr.) (excluding black people from membership of
registered trade unions and prohibiting registration of black trade unions); Mines
and Works Act of 1911 (S. Afr.) (permitting competency certificates for a number
of skilled mining occupations).

2018]

RULE OF LAW, STATE CAPTURE AND HUMAN DEV'T

799

government, fully captured by a coalition of mining interests and
white labor unions, also introduced what came to be referred to as
the “civilized labor policy,”—this policy created jobs for poor whites
(mostly Afrikaners) in the public sector and “gave preferential
treatment to industries that hired a significant percentage of civilized
labor.”105
The overarching objective of those who controlled the South
African state at this time was to restrict the economic activities of
certain population groups, primarily those of African groups. By
doing so, the government effectively reduced the participation of
these groups in economic activities.106 The system of separate
development or apartheid that was established by the Nationalist
Party in 1948 represented a formal recognition or acceptance of
practices that had been part of the country’s history since early
European settlers chose forced labor systems, the expropriation of
the property rights of African groups in land, and racial segregation
as part of public policy.107 As a form of state capture, apartheid
singled out part of the South African population for better treatment
by the government and granted them a superior form of citizenship,
while subjecting the majority, which consisted of several African

105. John M. Mbaku, Property Rights and Rent Seeking in South Africa, 11
CATO J. 135, 142 (1991).
106. To effectively make certain that these groups remained on the economic
margins, it was also critical that they not be allowed to participate in the political
system, especially in the design of legislation. Thus, under the system that came
into being with the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, all African
groups (i.e., Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, South Sotho (Basotho), Tswana, Venda, Ndebele,
Tsonga, Swazi, and North Sotho (Bapedi), the Khoi, and San) were not allowed to
participate in the country’s political system. See generally DOXEY, supra note 104,
at 127 (emphasizing the impact of South Africa’s enactment of discriminatory
laws); HUTT, supra note 104 (noting that restrictions on the economic activities of
African groups affected their ability to engage in wage employment as well as in
entrepreneurial activities); P. ERIC LOUW, THE RISE, FALL, AND LEGACY OF
APARTHEID 57 (2004) (examining, inter alia, the Afrikaner Nationalist Period in
South Africa (1948–1993) and the struggles of Africans to improve their political
participation during this period and in the aftermath of the fall of the apartheid
system and the emergence of non-racial democracy).
107. E.g., The History of Apartheid in South Africa, STANFORD UNIV.,
http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2018).
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ethno-cultural groups, to an inferior form of citizenship.108 The racist
and cruel system transferred virtually all the value extracted from the
economy to the white elites, business interests, and the favored
group—whites in general.109
Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress compatriots
fought to dismantle what was essentially a coalition of white
business interests, white elites, and white labor designed to
perpetuate permanent African inferiority. In a prepared speech
delivered during his trial for treason before the Pretoria Supreme
Court on April 20, 1964, Mandela argued that the apartheid system
created two types of citizenships in South Africa: One for whites
and, second, an extremely attenuated citizenship for Africans. He
declared that South Africa is:
a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The whites
enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the
world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty
percent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and,
in some cases, drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion
and the overworking of the soil makes it impossible for them
to live properly off the land. Thirty percent are laborers, labor
tenants, and squatters on white farms and work and live under
conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages.
The other thirty percent live in towns where they have
developed economic and social habits which bring them
closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most
Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low
incomes and high cost of living. 110
He went on to argue that the South Africa that he and his fellow
freedom fighters envisioned was one in which citizenship would not
be based on race, ethnicity, or some attributable trait, but on a shared
vision for the peaceful coexistence of all groups, equality of
108. See generally JESSICA PIOMBO, INSTITUTIONS, ETHNICITY, AND POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 10 (2009) (giving an introduction to ethnicity and
ethnolinguistic groups in South Africa); TUKUFU ZUBERI ET AL., THE
DEMOGRAPHY OF SOUTH AFRICA 11 (2005) (elaborating the racial classifications
from 1911-1996).
109. E.g., LANE, supra note 45, at 256.
110. Nelson Mandela, I Am Prepared to Die (1964), http://www.history
place.com/speeches/mandela.htm.
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opportunity for self-actualization, and a society undergirded by the
rule of law.111 The country would eventually incorporate and
enshrine these ideals in its permanent post-apartheid constitution—
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996—that is
considered one of the most progressive in the world.112
2. A Note of Clarification
Before we examine state capture under South Africa’s progressive
constitution, we need to clarify certain issues that relate to the quality
of institutions and state capture. Attempts by private business
interests to capture the state can occur in any country. What is clear
is that some countries are more susceptible and less able to deal with
state capture than others. Especially vulnerable to state capture are
countries that have relatively weak institutions—specifically,
countries with governing processes that do not adequately constrain
the state and, as a consequence, state custodians (i.e., civil servants
and political elites) can easily engage in corrupt and rent-seeking
activities. These countries are characterized by weak or ineffective
checks and balances; opacity in the design and implementation of
public policies, as well as in the development and adoption of postconstitutional laws; the absence of strong and robust civil societies;
the lack of free and independent press; the failure of the government
to provide citizens with the wherewithal to petition the state to
redress their grievances; capriciousness in the allocation of public
goods and services; and massive state interventions in the economy
which significantly increase rents flowing to the government and,
hence, the opportunities for those who have successfully captured the
state to generate extra-legal income for themselves.
Of particular importance is the fact that in countries with weak
institutions—that is, those whose states are quite susceptible to
capture—there is an absence of institutional mechanisms to check on
the ways through which the various rents are extracted, generated,

111. Id.
112. VALERIE MØLLER & DENIS HUSCHKA, QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE: ADVANCES IN QUALITY-OF-LIFE STUDIES, THEORY AND
RESEARCH 142 (2009).
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and actually allocated.113 Of course, in such countries, corruption,
which is often used by private business interests to capture the state,
is pervasive.
In countries with strong and effective democratic institutions (e.g.,
an independent judiciary, a free press, a robust and politically–active
civil society), individuals or groups that attempt to capture the state
can easily be frustrated. It is often the case in countries with effective
and fully functioning democratic systems that individuals who
attempt to subvert national laws and engage in efforts to capture
either the state or some of its institutions or agencies are exposed by
the press. In the United States, for example, the events that are
known generally as the Watergate Affair, and which centered on the
abuse of power by the Nixon Administration, were exposed by the
independent press.114 The country’s other democratic institutions, the
judiciary and the legislature, all of which were independent of the
offending executive, played critical roles in resolving what could
have turned into a major constitutional crisis.115
But, with respect to state capture, what is the difference between a
country with relatively strong and effective institutions and one with
weak institutions? As had been examined earlier, countries with
relatively weak institutions are quite susceptible to state capture and
once the state has been captured and outside interests seize the
legislative and reform processes, it is often very difficult to reverse
course and bring about more effective laws and institutions. In the
case of a country with strong and effective institutions, while private
113. See generally ANDREW C. KUTCHINS, RUSSIA AFTER THE FALL 9-10 (2002)
(arguing that “powerful businesspeople and entrepreneurs will oppose the
development of any institutions that may prevent them from being able to acquire
valuable assets at below market price”); REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE
INSTIUTITONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM (Benjamin L.
Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD
GOVERNANCE (Sisay Asefa & Wei-Chiao Huang eds., 2015).
114. The Watergate Story, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/watergate/part1.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
115. See generally WILLIAM DUDLEY, WATERGATE (2002); ELIZABETH DREW,
WASHINGTON JOURNAL: THE EVENTS OF 1973-1974 112 (Duckworth Overlook
2014) (1974) (“[N]ot even the highest office in the land has the authority to break
the law in the name of national security”); DAVID HOSANSKY, EYEWITNESS TO
WATERGATE (2006).
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interests may not be able to capture the entire government or
governing process, they may be able to bring under their control
branches of the government. For example, private business interests
might be able to corrupt the executive and capture that branch of the
government. Nevertheless, the country’s other institutions, including
especially the independent press, are usually able to expose such
corruption, paving the way for the independent judiciary to take
action to restore the integrity of the country’s democratic institutions,
including the executive branch. Thus, in countries with relatively
strong and effective institutions, the threat of and potential for state
capture is not entirely eliminated. However, while it is possible for
private interests to capture certain branches of government, the
process is usually short-lived because other institutions can expose
the corrupt activities of elites in such political systems, as well as
bring culprits to justice, and restore the country’s democratic
institutions.116
While a country may have strong and effective institutions, the
behavior of its civil servants and political elites can significantly
increase its vulnerability to capture. Thus, in the United States, a
country with strong and relatively effective institutions, it has often
been the case that some members of the various branches of
government (e.g., President Richard Nixon of the executive branch117
and Congressman John Jenrette of the U.S. House of
Representatives)118 have engaged in corrupt activities that have
compromised their offices. Nevertheless, thanks to the country’s
relatively strong institutions (e.g., an independent press, an
116. See, e.g., PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, STATE OF CAPTURE 29
(Report No. 6 of 2016/17, 2016) (investigating unethical and improper conduct of
the President and other government officials).
117. See generally TOM COATES, THE WATERGATE AFFAIR, 1972: THE
RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON (2002); MICHAEL A. GENOVESE,
THE WATERGATE CRISIS 70 (1999) (discussing Nixon’s defense); LOUIS W.
LIEBOVICH, RICHARD NIXON, WATERGATE, AND THE PRESS: A HISTORICAL
RETROSPECTIVE ix-x (2003) (elaborating on the consequences of the Watergate
crisis, including the imprisonment of some of the nation’s most powerful leaders).
118. See SCOTT CRASS, STATESMEN AND MISCHIEF MAKERS: OFFICEHOLDERS
WHO WERE FOOTNOTES IN THE DEVELOPMENTS OF HISTORY FROM KENNEDY TO
REAGAN (2016) (showing that while Richard Nixon was implicated in the
Watergate Scandal, Congressman John Jenrette was involved in what the Federal
Bureau of Investigation called ABSCAM).

804

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:4

independent judiciary), these activities have not resulted in the
capture of the entire governing process, which occurred in countries
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo that have extremely weak
and dysfunctional institutional arrangements.119
The extent to which the government intervenes in or interferes
with private exchange can have a significant impact on the state’s
susceptibility to capture. In many African countries, for example,
government intervention in the economy is quite pervasive and, in
addition, most natural resources are reserved exclusively for
government exploitation. In these economies, then, the state is
usually the largest economic actor and the one to which most of the
rents created within the economy accrue. Government ownership of
productive resources and high levels of state intervention in
economic activities produce an environment where successful
captors of the state are likely to have access to significant rents. Such
a state—that is, one that owns and controls most of the country’s
productive resources, engages in significant levels of intervention in
economic activities, and is characterized by relatively weak
institutions—is quite susceptible to capture.120
Similarly, in South Africa, where the executive branch of
government was, until recently, headed by President Jacob Zuma,
who has been implicated in several corruption scandals over the last
few years,121 private business interests have been able to capture the
executive branch of government. Nevertheless, the country’s strong
institutions, including an independent press, a very robust civil
119. See Attacks on Justice - Democratic Republic of the Congo,
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48abdd680.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2018)
(highlighting that despite the political progress towards a democratic state based on
the rule of law in the DRC, ongoing violence has hampered the effectiveness of the
judicial system, and even though a new constitution granted judicial independence,
the judiciary’s situation is still worrying since impunity is the norm, and corruption
and interference by the executive are widespread).
120. E.g., WORLD BANK, MAKING TRANSITION WORK FOR EVERYONE, supra
note 86, at 15.
121. See, e.g., David Blair, Jacob Zuma ‘Should’ Face 783 Criminal Charges,
Declares South African Court, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 29, 2016, 11:44 AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/29/south-african-court-clears-way-forjacob-zuma-to-face-783-crimin/ (suggesting that, as the South African Court
declares, Jacob Zuma “should” face many criminal charges).
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society, and the independent office of the Public Protector, have been
able to expose the alleged misdeeds of the president and his business
partners.122 It is now left to the country’s other institutions (the
legislature and the judiciary) to perform their constitutional functions
and legally resolve all the issues associated with the alleged state
capture.
In the years leading to the decision by South Africa’s Public
Protector to launch its investigation, there had arisen within South
Africa’s civil society debates and discussions about the possibility
that, at the very least, the executive branch had been captured by
private business interests.123 Some members of civil society had
come to the conclusion that the South African State was gradually
becoming dysfunctional and that political power was no longer being
used to enhance the national welfare. Instead, various government
offices, including that of the President of the Republic, were being
utilized to serve private interests.
3. The African National Congress and State Capture
Some South Africans believe that their state’s vulnerability to
capture was triggered by the transformation of Mandela’s African
National Congress (ANC) into a political entity that was no longer
interested in pursuing the ideals that revolve around liberating the
country from apartheid.124 The ANC’s critics argued that rather than
pursue and promote the ideals that brought the party to power (e.g.,
the democratic revolution, which was supposed to involve, at the
very least, the overthrow and dismantling of the colonial and
122. See PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 116, at 27 (showing an
investigation into complaints of improper and unethical conduct by the President
and other government officials in removing and appointing ministers and directors
to benefit the Gupta family business).
123. See State Capture Research Project, How South Africa Is Being Stolen Read the Shocking Report, RAND DAILY MAIL (May 26, 2017, 6:50 AM),
https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-05-26-how-south-africa-isbeing-stolen---read-the-shocking-report/ (demonstrating how empirically-based
public reports note that state institutions have been captured and repurposed).
124. See id. (“It is now clear that while the ideological focus of the ANC is
‘radical economic transformation’, in practice Jacob Zuma’s presidency is aimed at
repurposing state institutions to consolidate the Zuma-centered power elite . . .
popularly referred to as ‘state capture.’”).
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racially-based anachronism known as apartheid and establish a
democratic, non-racial, South Africa), the party evolved into an
opportunistic entity, which was being used to maximize the interests
of certain private interests at the expense of the South African
people.125 In the process, argued the ANC’s critics (e.g., Julius
Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters), the party’s leader,
President Zuma, became a liability to the country and its democratic
future—he was no longer willing to uphold the country’s cherished
ideals. According to his critics, the president’s continued efforts to
concentrate political power in the executive branch directly violated
the ANC’s key ideological principle to enhance democratic
participation.126
That President Zuma and the ANC had evolved into opportunistic
political beings, argued the ANC’s critics, was finally revealed by
the sacking of former finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene,127 an action
that was not received well by both domestic and international
markets.128
125. See, e.g., ANC Silent on State Capture Because Party is Central to the
Problem - Analyst, CAPE TALK (Sep. 26, 2017, 1:04 PM),
http://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/273966/anc-silent-on-state-capture-becauseparty-is-central-to-the-problem-analyst (arguing that the ANC needs to
acknowledge its role in the state’s capture); see also Masa Kekana, Malema
Blames ANC Voters for Current SA Crisis, EYEWITNESS NEWS,
http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/13/julius-malema-blames-anc-voters-for-sa-s-crisis (last
visited Feb. 27, 2018) (blaming ANC voters for the current crisis in South Africa).
126. E.g., Michaela Elsbeth Martin & Hussein Solomon, Understanding the
Phenomenon of “State Capture” in South Africa, 5 SOUTHERN AFR. PEACE
SECURITY STUD. 21, 23 (2016); see also RICHARD PITHOUSE, WRITING THE
DECLINE: ON THE STRUGGLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMOCRACY 92 (2016) (“[T]he
people of the [ANC] party are often the equivalent of the 90 people, out of more
than 30,000, that, stepping over or around the bodies of the seven that didn’t
survive the contest, had a shot of becoming traffic cops and climbing Jacob’s
ladder.”).
127. E.g., Nhlanhla Nene: South Africa Uproar After Finance Minister Sacked,
BBC (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35059563; see also
Andrew England, Finance Minister Sacking Undermines South Africa’s
Reputation, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ef32278c9f35-11e5-beba-5e33e2b79e46 (showing that the finance minister’s dismissal
actually resulted in the plummeting of the rand against the dollar and European
currencies).
128. See Jason Burke, South Africa: ANC in Chaos After Jacob Zuma Sacks
Finance
Minister,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
31,
2017,
2:05
PM),
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Other critics of the ANC government argue that at the time it
constitutionally captured power in 1994, the ANC always intended to
capture the state and use its structures to promote its ideological and
political interests. By the time the investigation into state capture
began, the ANC government was totally in control of all state
structures except the Judiciary, the Office of the Public Protector and
the Independent Electoral Commission.129 According to one observer,
“[w]hat alarms the broader [South African] society, however, is the
extent to which the elements of the state have been captured by
President Jacob Zuma and those who surround him, for the
promotion of their own personal wealth, and not that of the African
National Congress nor the nation at large.”130
When President Zuma took office in 2009, he chose loyalty over
competence, skill, and expertise when making appointments to key
state institutions.131 He is said to have used vacancies in the
government to appoint his most loyal supporters, regardless of their
qualifications, to high positions in the government. By 2015, the
powerful and wealthy Gupta Family controlled the country’s
economic and political systems. According to Flyod Shivambu,132
deputy president of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the
Guptas have complete control over the executive branch of the South
African government, including the ability to manipulate the
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. They also use this
influence effectively to extract extra-legal benefits for themselves,
their business associates, and assorted benefactors.133
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/31/south-africa-anc-jacob-zumacyril-ramaphosa (emphasizing the criticisms of the President’s decision).
129. E.g., Martin & Solomon, supra note 126, at 24.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Gareth van Onselen, State capture? We’ve been having it!, RAND
DAILY MAIL (Mar. 23, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.businesslive.co.za/
rdm/politics/2016-03-23-state-capture-weve-been-having-it/ (arguing that the
ANC’s state capture was “set out at the party’s 1997 Mafikeng conference in the
adoption of a cadre deployment resolution, whereby those loyal to the party would
be placed throughout the state”).
132. E.g., Floyd Shivambu, State Capture: It’s Criminal, and It Is Nothing New,
DAILY MAVERICK (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/
2016-03-24-state-capture-its-criminal-and-it-is-nothing-new/#.Wp3VYegbOUm.
133. See id. (noting that Jacob Zuma is a business partner of the Guptas, so the
Guptas then “abuse the fact that they are in a corrupt business relationship with
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By the time the Office of Public Protector began its investigation,
the president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, had weakened the powers of
many of the state’s independent agencies to the point where they
were no longer capable of effectively performing their assigned
functions.134
4. South Africa and the 2016 Public Protector’s State Capture
Report
Many South Africans, including especially members of the
opposition, praised the release of the Public Protector’s report into
state capture and argued that the successful completion of the
investigation and its release augured well for the rule of law,
constitutionalism, the fight against corruption and public financial
malfeasance, and South Africa’s democratic institutions.135
As if to reassure South Africans of why it was necessary for her to
undertake the investigation, and to place the report and the
investigation within a context that speaks to a need to protect the
country’s democratic order, Public Protector Madonsela opened the
report with a quotation from decisions of the country’s highest
court—the Constitutional Court:
One of the crucial elements of our constitutional vision is to make a
decisive break from the unchecked abuse of State power and resources
that was virtually institutionalized during the apartheid era. To achieve
this goal, we adopted accountability, the rule of law and the supremacy of
the Constitution as values of our constitutional democracy. For this
Zuma to bully government departments and state-owned companies into illegally
siphoning money from the state into their own pockets”).
134. See, e.g., Lynsey Chutel, South Africa’s Biggest State Companies are
Getting Caught up in Politics - and It’s Starting to Hurt Them, QUARTZ AFR.
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://qz.com/772027/south-africas-biggest-state-companies-aregetting-caught-up-in-politics-and-its-starting-to-hurt-them/ (recognizing that the
political fighting in South Africa is “scaring off lenders from state-owned
companies and potentially weakening everything in the economy from electricity
to agriculture” by halting loans to many state companies).
135. See, e.g., 13 Damning Findings in the Public Protector’s State Capture
Report, BUSINESSTECH (Nov. 2, 2016), https://businesstech.co.za/news/
general/142151/13-damning-findings-in-the-public-protectors-state-capture-report/
(noting that following the findings in the report, the Democratic Alliance leader,
Mmusi Maimane, stated that President Zuma “should do the honourable thing and
resign”).
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reason, public office-bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at their
peril. This is so because constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of
law constitute the sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop the
ugly head of impunity off its stiffened neck. It is against this backdrop
that the following remarks must be understood:136
Certain values in the Constitution have been designated as foundational to
our democracy. This in turn means that as pillar-stones of this democracy,
they must be observed scrupulously. If these values are not observed and
their precepts not carried out conscientiously, we have a recipe for a
constitutional crisis of great magnitude. In a State predicated on a desire
to maintain the rule of law, it is imperative that one and all should be
driven by a moral obligation to ensure the continued survival of our
democracy.137

These court decisions speak directly to several issues regarding the
need to protect South Africa’s democracy from the destructive
effects of opportunistic state and non-state actors. The Constitutional
Court recognizes (1) the destructive effects of “unchecked abuse of
State power and resources”—a practice that was pervasive in the
ancient régime (i.e., the apartheid government); (2) the fact that
under South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional order, public
officials who abuse their constitutional obligations will and must be
punished; (3) that constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of
law represent important constraints against government impunity and
hence, must be safeguarded; and (4) the fact that the constitution is
the foundation of the country’s democratic order and must be
protected. The need to protect the constitution and hence, the
country’s democracy, implies that those who threaten the latter,
through, for example, their engagement in corrupt activities, must be
brought to justice. Hence, the decision to investigate accusations of
impropriety in the Zuma presidency was made possible by the need
136. E.g., Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the National Assembly
2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC) at 4 para. 1 (S. Afr.); see also MICHAEL MARCHANT,
STATE OF CAPTURE’ REPORT: SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMOCRACY FIGHTS BACK
CORRUPTION 1 (2016) (providing additional commentary on the report); see
generally HAROON BHORAT ET AL., BETRAYAL OF THE PROMISE: HOW SOUTH
AFRICA IS BEING STOLEN 3 (2017) (showing an independent analysis of the state
capture report that was produced and released by Public Protector Madonsela).
137. E.g., Nyathi v. Member of the Executive Council for the Department of
Health, Gauteng 2008 (9) BCLR 865 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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to protect the country’s constitutional order.
What specifically was the Public Protector supposed to
investigate? She was supposed to carry out “an investigation into
complaints of alleged improper and unethical conduct by the
president.”138 She was also supposed to investigate other “state
functionariess relating to alleged improper relationships and
involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of
ministers and directors of State Owned Entities (SOEs)” that resulted
“in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts and
benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses.”139 The Office of the
Public Protector received complaints about government improprieties
and in accordance with its powers elaborated in Section 182 of the
Constitution and Sections Six and Seven of the Public Protector Act,
1994, proceeded to investigate.140
The report found evidence that points to significant wrongdoing,
conflicts of interest, corruption, and a lot of governmental
impunity.141 Most of the wrongdoing, the report concluded, was tied
to or arose out of the relationship between the Guptas and President
Zuma and his son, Duduzane Zuma.142 In his reaction to the report’s
findings and decision by President Zuma to seek to legally delay its
release to the public,143 leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance,
Mmusi Maimane, stated that “[t]he manner in which Jacob Zuma has
conducted himself is completely dishonorable and unbecoming of the
nation’s President. He has actively tried to delay the release of this
report, disrespected the Office of the Public Protector, and wasted
millions of rands144 of public money in frivolous litigation.”145
138. South African President, Jacob Zuma. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA,
supra note 116, at 4.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Conor Gaffey, South Africa: Five Things Thulu Madonsela’s State
Capture Report Told Us, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 11, 2016, 2:56 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/south-africa-five-thuli-madonsela-state-capture-report516630 (noting that President Zuma had taken legal action to delay the publication
of the report).
144. Currencies, CRN INDIA, http://www.crnindia.com/currency/rand.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018) (defining the Rand as South Africa’s currency).
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Mmusi Maimane continued to welcome the remedial action that
was prescribed after the report’s release—the requirement that the
President of the Republic appoint a commission of inquiry within 30
days of the report’s release to undertake further investigation. This
remedial action is in accordance with the requirements of §6(4)(c)(i)
of the Public Protector Act and was designed to enhance the
restoration of the country’s democratic values.146 Specifically, the
President was expected to appoint a commission of inquiry headed
by a judge, but the judge had to be selected by the country’s Chief
Justice and not President Zuma. In Economic Freedom Fighters v.
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance
v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others,147 the Constitutional
Court of South Africa held that President Zuma had breached the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa by not implementing
the recommendations of the Public Protector’s Nklandla148 report.149
5. Findings of South Africa’s State Capture Report
Allegations by South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Finance,
Mcebisi Jonas, formed the heart of the Public Protector’s
investigation.150 Jonas told Thuli Madonsela, the Public Protector,
that he had been taken to the Gupta family home by President
Zuma’s son (Duduzane Zuma). While at the Guptas, one of the
145. 13 Damning Findings in the Public Protector’s State Capture Report,
supra note 135.
146. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 112 (“[I]f [the Public Protector] is of the opinion
that the facts disclose the commission of an offence by any person, to bring the
matter to the notice of the relevant authority charged with prosecutions.”).
147. United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the National Assembly and
Others 2017 (1) SA 21 (ZACC) (S. Afr.).
148. David Smith, Jacob Zuma Faces Investigation Over Plans to Renovate
Home, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2012, 7:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/oct/08/jacob-zuma-investigation-plans-home
(detailing
the
investigation launched by the Public Protector, according to whom President Zuma
had unduly benefited from the publicly-financed improvements and the
Constitutional Court subsequently determined that the National Assembly and
President Zuma had failed to uphold the South African constitution).
149. United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the National Assembly and
Others, (1) SA 21 at 33 para. 83.
150. Ferial Haffajee, 4 Days in December, CITY PRESS (Dec. 8, 2016, 10:35
AM), https://city-press.news24.com/Special-Report/4_days_in_December/4-daysin-december-20161205-4.
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Gupta brothers, Ajay Gupta, had offered him the Minister of Finance
position in Zuma’s cabinet.151 The offer was conditional on Jonas
firing several Treasury officials who, according to Ajay, were a
major obstacle to the maximization of certain Gupta family business
objectives.152 In addition to the offer, Ajay is also alleged to have
offered Jonas a $45 million bribe. Jonas told the Public Protector that
he had declined all of Ajay’s offers.153
With respect to the important findings of the investigation, the
Public Protector determined first, that President Zuma had
improperly and in violation of the Executive Ethics Code, permitted
Gupta family members and his son, Duduzane Zuma, “to be involved
in the process of removal and appointment of the Minister of Finance
in December 2015.”154 Second, there was no evidence that President
Zuma, as head of the executive branch, had investigated the
allegations made by the Deputy Minister of Finance. This failure, the
report continued, was especially glaring because the Minister’s
allegations had become public and were widely shared in the
country. The report concluded that if the President did fail to
investigate the allegations made by Jonas, then he may have violated
provisions §2.3(c) of the Executive Ethics Code.155
Third, Des van Rooyen, who replaced former finance minister,
Nhlanhla Nene, after President Zuma fired the latter, visited the
Gupta home on several occasions, including on the day the
government announced van Rooyen’s appointment.156 Fourth, the
report also alleged that the President of the Republic and the Gupta
family colluded and used state-owned enterprises, including Eskom,
the country’s electricity provider, and Denel, an arms manufacturer,
to award the Gupta family group of businesses lucrative state
contracts.157 The report also asserts that the boards of state-owned
enterprises were improperly appointed, in an effort to enhance the
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 116, at 94.
154. Id. at 14.
155. Id.; see also Executive Members Act 82 of 1998 § 2.3(c), GN 19406 of GG
(28 Oct. 1998) (S. Afr.).
156. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 116, at 14.
157. Id. at 18.
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ability of the Gupta family group of businesses to secure government
contracts.158 These allegations point to a serious weakness in the
structure of the South African economy generally and the
management of state-owned enterprises in particular. If these
allegations are true, then the executive branch has corruptly diverted
state resources to private interests, depriving the public of valuable
resources for poverty alleviation and human development. In
addition, the presidency has unconstitutionally allowed the
management of public policy to be dominated and controlled by
private interests.159
Fifth, the report alleges that President Zuma and other members of
his cabinet improperly interfered in the relationship between banks
and Gupta family-owned business enterprises. By doing so, they
granted these firms preferential treatment on matters that the
country’s independent regulatory agencies routinely managed.160
Sixth, President Zuma used his position as the country’s chief
executive, as well as confidential information entrusted to him, to
generate extra-legal income for himself, members of his family, and
the Gupta family.161 The president gave preferential treatment to the
Gupta family when awarding state contracts, trade licenses, and
access to credit.162 Seventh, the government restructured its
advertising spending to benefit a Gupta-owned newspaper, the New
Age, a process that represented a direct threat to the sustainability of
a competitive media market in the country.163
What is important for the purposes of this article is that the reader
be given an overview of the extent to which the Public Protector’s
report determined the existence of significant improprieties and
unconstitutional behavior within the South African State. Hence, it is
not necessary to list all the findings of the report. Interested readers
can access the report for themselves.164
158. Id. at 16.
159. Id. at 47.
160. Id. at 10.
161. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 116, at 6.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 66.
164. See generally id. at 4-335 (listing the public prosecutor’s findings based on
investigation of unethical and improper conduct of the President and other
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6. Implications of the State Capture Report for Governance in South
Africa
The Public Protector’s report found evidence alleging that the
government granted the Gupta family privileged access to South
Africa’s executive branch during the last several years. Hence, the
Gupta family has been able to exert significant influence on
important policy decisions made by the government. From a political
economy point of view, one can see at least two important
implications for South Africans. First, is that this relationship
between the Guptas and the presidency may have distorted economic
incentives and created a situation where profitability in the economy
was no longer determined by expertise, business acumen, and the
ability to produce goods and services that are competitive in both
price and quality. Instead, rent seeking and corruption had emerged
as the two most important determinants of profitability. The ability
of Gupta-owned businesses to distort market incentives through their
influence on the government implied that they no longer needed to
operate efficiently and competitively in order to maximize profit.
That, of course, did not augur well for other firms, which were now
unable to compete effectively against the politically-connected
Guptas.
Second, in addition to the damage that this relationship created in
the country’s markets, there is the possibility that unless measures
are undertaken to remedy the situation, South Africa’s evolving
democracy and its relatively young institutions could be permanently
damaged.
The president has already been sanctioned by the Constitutional
Court for failing to perform his constitutionally-mandated duty to
“uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of
the land,” when he failed to comply with the findings of the Public
Protector in the Nkandla case—the corruption scandal involving
allegations that the president had used state funds to refurbish his
private home outside the municipality of Nkandla.165 Since then,
many South Africans, especially members of the opposition, have
government officials).
165. United Democratic Movement v. Speaker of the National Assembly and
Others, (1) SA 21.

2018]

RULE OF LAW, STATE CAPTURE AND HUMAN DEV'T

815

been calling on the President and some members of his political
party to resign.166 It is hoped that these existing pressures, coupled
with the results of the State Capture167 report, would force the
President to put aside his personal interests and those of his
benefactors to save the country’s democracy.
Unlike democratic systems in many other countries in Africa,
South Africa’s democracy is not in its embryonic stages; however,
the country’s democratic system cannot be said to be fully matured
and institutionalized either. Thus, as the country struggles to deepen
and institutionalize its democracy, there is no doubt that it will
encounter problems. Even the most developed and matured
democracies, such as the United States, have been forced to deal with
opportunistic behaviors, such as corruption and rent seeking, that are
potentially damaging to their political and economic systems from
time-to-time. Nevertheless, highly developed democracies, such as
the United States, have been able to deal effectively with political
scandals that have threatened their governing processes and created
potential constitutional crises.168
Of course, the American Republic was able to effectively and fully
handle political scandals, such as the Watergate Affair and the
Abscam scandal because of the existence of strong democratic
institutions—particularly, a robust independent press, an independent
judiciary, and a legislature that is capable of checking on the exercise
of government power. Perhaps, more important is the fact that the
United States has a strong and politically active civil society that has
functioned as an effective check on the government. Because U.S.
institutions have been able to deal fully and effectively with the
various threats to its constitutional order, the country has managed to
deepen and institutionalize its democratic system. Thus, permanent
166. Jason Burke, Cyril Ramaphosa Chosen to Lead South Africa’s Ruling ANC
Party, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2017, 4:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/dec/18/cyril-ramaphosa-chosen-to-lead-south-africas-ruling-anc-party
(detailing the internal processes and elections of the ANC since December 2017).
Zuma resigned as President of the Republic of South Africa, effective February 14,
2018.
167. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 116.
168. Watergate: The Scandal that Brought Down Richard Nixon,
WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
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damage to South Africa’s constitutional order would come not
because the Guptas captured the executive branch, but from the
failure of the country’s other institutions and its citizens to deal fully
with the “Gupta Affair.”
The Public Protector’s report reveals systemic and extensive abuse
of power within the executive branch of government in South
Africa.169 It also reveals that the legislative branch is either unwilling
or unable to perform the important function of serving as a check on
the executive.170 In addition, there are suggestions that corruption has
compromised some of the country’s counteracting agencies, such as
the National Prosecuting Authority and the Directorate for Priority
Crime Investigation (DPCI) (Hawks). Therefore, they may not be
relied upon to deal fully and effectively with government
impunity.171
Nevertheless, it is important for the reader and South Africans to
recognize that the country still has democratic institutions that are
capable of fully confronting and effectively resolving all the issues
uncovered by the Public Protector’s report. Importantly, the Office of
the Public Protector, which is an independent state body, unearthed
the events and activities behind the capture of the state by the Guptas
by working along with robust civil society organizations (specifically
independent media). In addition, the Constitutional Court remains
quite independent and has already exhibited that independence by
ruling against the government.172 While the State Capture report has
revealed serious threats to South Africa’s fledgling democracy, it is
important to recognize the fact that this is a battle over the country’s
constitutional order and its democratic institutions. The nature of this
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Danielle Hoffmeester, The Independence of South Africa’s DPCI Under
Threat?, S. AFR. CATH. BISHOP’S CONF. PARLIAMENTARY LIAISON OFF., May
2015,
http://www.cplo.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BP-381-TheIndependence-of-South-Africas-DPCI-under-Threat-May-2015.pdf;
Mtende
Mhango, Don’t Touch Independence of NPA, IOL (July 13, 2014, 7:27 AM),
https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/dont-touch-independence-of-npa1718836.
172. See Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the National Assembly, (5)
BCLR 618 at 51 para. 105 (finding the President’s actions inconsistent with the
Constitution).

2018]

RULE OF LAW, STATE CAPTURE AND HUMAN DEV'T

817

battle will determine the future of the country and its democracy. Of
course, the report itself is a testament to the effectiveness of, at the
very least, some of the country’s independent institutions and the
resilience of its democratic system.
South Africans, however, must realize that while it is important
that everyone involved in the Gupta Affair, including the President,
other public servants, and the Guptas themselves, be prosecuted by a
court of law, and if found guilty they should be punished as
prescribed by the law, it is more important that the country place its
emphasis on dealing with corruption and other forms of impunity by
strengthening the country’s institutions in order to foreclose any
possibility of state capture again. Thus, the lesson for South Africans
from this experience is that all political systems, including those
which are undergirded by strong democratic institutions, are
vulnerable to attack by individuals seeking to capture the state and
use its structures for personal enrichment. Strengthening the
country’s democratic institutions and significantly enhancing the
ability of civil society to monitor and check on the exercise of
government power should safeguard the state against capture.
Therefore, South Africans should insist on an effective judicial
inquiry, followed by prosecutions of those found to be complicit in
state capture and corruption. Finally, there should be systematic
efforts to strengthen national institutions, including, especially
efforts to minimize any attempts to interfere with freedom of the
press.

IV. STATE CAPTURE AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. INTRODUCTION
State capture, as discussed earlier, is an extreme form of grand
corruption.173 The extent of corruption in a country is determined, by
the nature of the country’s institutional arrangements. Similarly, the
ability of private business interests to capture the state is affected
173. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES: A CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE vii (Yahong Zhang & Cecilia Lavena eds., 2015)
(examining, inter alia, political corruption in various cultural locations and how it
relates to state capture).
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significantly by whether the country’s governance process is
undergirded by the rule of law. For example, if a “country’s
institutional arrangements guarantee the rule of law, and civil
servants and politicians (i.e., state custodians) are adequately
constrained by the law, then corruption and other forms of impunity
will be minimized.”174 Similarly, in a country where state custodians
are well-constrained by the law, private business interests are likely
to find it quite difficult to corruptly capture the state.
Of course, as discussed earlier, even in a country with an effective
governance process, such as the United States, the state is still
susceptible to capture. However, in a country whose governance
system is undergirded by the rule of law, prospects for state capture
are minimized. In this section, we shall examine how fidelity to the
rule of law in a country can significantly minimize opportunities for
state capture.

B. WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW?
Over the years, legal scholars and philosophers have struggled to
define the concept called “rule of law.”175 Most scholars believe that
the foundation for the modern definition of the rule of law was laid
by British legal philosopher Albert Venn Dicey176 in the 19th
century. As argued by Dicey,177 the rule of law must embody three
critical concepts: (1) the law is supreme; (2) all citizens are equal
before the law; and (3) the principle that the rights of individuals
must be established through court decisions must be accepted and
respected.178 Notable modern contributors to the definition of the rule
of law include the late Rt. Hon. Lord Bingham of Cornhill KG,179 a
174. Mbaku, International Law, supra note 22, at 663.
175. See CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF
GLOBAL POLITICS (2014) (examining, inter alia, the important role of the rule of
law in international political economy); Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra
note 8, at 959.
176. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION xi (1982).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW vii (Penguin 2011) (examining the rule
of law and providing a definition for it, as well as arguing that the rule of law is the
foundation for the modern state system).
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distinguished British judge and jurist, who, before his death in 2010,
served as Master of the Rolls,180 Lord Chief Justice,181 and Senior
Law Lord.182
On Thursday November 16, 2006 at the Center for Public Law,
University of Cambridge,183 Lord Bingham elaborated on eight subrules which, he argued, comprised the rule of law184 Lord Bingham
argued that “the core of the existing principle” of the rule of law is
that “all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or
private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws
publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly
administered in the courts.”185 Lord Bingham set out the following
sub-rules, which he stated undergird the Rule of Law:
1. the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and
predictable;
2. questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by
application of the law and not the exercise of discretion;
3. the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that
objective differences justify differentiation;
4. the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights;

180. See generally GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM (8th ed. 2006) (defining the position and roles of the Keeper or Master of
the Rolls and Records of the Chancery of England, known as the Master of the
Rolls).
181. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT 2005:
REPORT WITH EVIDENCE, 2005-6, HL 83, at 5 (UK) (defining the roles of the Lord
Chief Justice of England and Wales before and after the Constitutional Reform Act
of 2005).
182. REBECCA HUXLEY-BINNS & JACQUELINE MARTIN, UNLOCKING THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the “law lord” system as it
applies to England and Wales).
183. Bob Hepple, Sir David Williams Obituary, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2009, 6:54
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/22/david-williams-obituary.
184. Thomas Bingham, President, Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, The
Rule of Law, Lecture at Sir David Williams Lectures (Nov. 16, 2006), in ‘The Rule
of Law’ Text Transcript, CPL, https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/sir-david-williamslectures2006-rule-law/rule-law-text-transcript (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
185. Id.
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5. means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or
inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are
unable to resolve;
6. ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers
conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which the
powers were conferred and without exceeding the limits of such powers;
7. that adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair; and
8. the existing principle of the rule of law requires compliance by the state
with its obligations in international law, the law which whether deriving
from treaty or international custom and practice governs the conduct of
nations.186

Professor Robert Stein187 has also contributed to the definition of
the rule of law. Stein188 began his analysis of the rule of law by
referring to Lord Bingham’s lecture189 and interpreted Lord
Bingham’s eight sub-rules to imply that “the law is superior, applies
equally, is known and predictable, and is administered through a
separation of powers.”190 Stein then provides his own definition of
the rule of law by arguing that a community governed by
institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law must be
characterized by the following:
1. The law is superior to all members of society, including government
officials vested with either executive, legislative, or judicial power.
2. The law is known, stable, and predictable. Laws are applied equally to
all persons in like circumstances. Laws are sufficiently defined and
government discretion sufficiently limited to ensure the law is applied
non-arbitrarily.
3. Members of society have the right to participate in the creation and
186. Id.
187. Robert Stein is the Everett Fraser Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota Law School. See generally Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It
Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293 (2009) (explaining the rule of law generally).
188. Id. (discussing Lord Bingham’s presentation on the rule of law in 2006).
189. See Thomas Bingham, supra note 185 (breaking down the rule of law into
eight sub-rules).
190. Stein, supra note 187, at 301.
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refinement of laws that regulate their behaviors.
4. The law is just and protects the human rights and dignity of all
members of society. Legal processes are sufficiently robust and
accessible to ensure enforcement of these protections by an independent
legal profession.
5. Judicial power is exercised independently of either the executive or
legislative powers and individual judges base their decisions solely on
facts and law of individual cases.191

The American Bar Association (ABA), an organization that
oversees, guides, and represents, lawyers and law students, is also
active in the movement to define the rule of law. The ABA also helps
institutionalize this important legal concept in emerging democracies
around the world. In 2007, the ABA launched a Rule of Law
Initiative (ABA ROLI), designed to “strengthen legal institutions, to
support legal professionals, to foster respect for human rights and to
advance public understanding of the law of citizen rights.”192 ABA
ROLI currently operates in more than 100 countries around the
world.193
Stating that “[t]he rule of law does not depend upon a U.S.-style
separation of powers,” the ABA argues that “[t]he key point is that
every form of government has to have some system to ensure that no
one in the government has so much power that they can act above the
law.”194 Although the rule of law consists of several elements or subrules, the most relevant to state capture in Africa, is that no one, “not
even the people who hold leadership positions in government,
including the executive, judiciary officers, and legislators, is above
191. See id. at 302 (noting that his definition is not “revolutionary” but based on
experts in jurisprudence).
192. See
Our
Origins
&
Principles,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/about/origin_principles.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2017) (adding in its purpose to consolidate its overseas law
programs).
193. Id. (including over 500 professional staff members).
194. Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, in ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., DIALOGUE
ON
THE
RULE OF LAW 4, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2017) (explaining that the rule of law does not depend on a U.S.-style
system or parliamentary system).
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the law—the law is supreme.”195
The United Nations (UN) has been among many international and
multilateral organizations that have also been interested in the rule of
law debate.196 Recently, the UN promulgated and published its own
definition for the rule of law. As stated by the UN,
[t]he ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law,
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.197

In Africa, and in many other countries around the world, the rule
of law is an ideal that their citizens seek and hope to achieve—a
governance process supported by the rule of law will ultimately
enhance the peaceful coexistence of each country’s various
population groups, promote inclusive economic growth, adequately
constrain state custodians, and minimize opportunistic behaviors, and
decrease contributions to state capture.198

C. THE RULE OF LAW’S ELEMENTS
A very important element of the rule of law is that “the

195. Id.
196. See What is the Rule of Law?, U.N. & RULE OF L.,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2017)
(revisiting the issue on numerous occasions, recently at its 67th Session in 2012).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2002: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 9, 17, 23 (2002) (ascribing how income and the rule
of law are directly correlated); MAY, supra note 176, at 1-5 (describing how the
rule of law shapes social imaginings); Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note
8, at 964 (demonstrating how necessary reforms can change African institutional
arrangements). All these works emphasize the importance of the rule of law to
economic growth and human development. While the World Bank and May
address their work to the global community writ large, Mbaku deals specifically
with growth and development in Africa.
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government must obey the law in its actions.”199 In other words, the
law is supreme and all citizens are bound by it. Hence, the first
element of the rule of law is the supremacy of law. Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, states that
“[t]he Law rests upon known, general principles applicable on equal
terms to all persons. It follows that the Law is superior to, and thus
binds, the government and all of its officials.”200
A country cannot fully maintain the rule of law if the majority of
its citizens do not voluntarily accept and respect the law. If the
majority of citizens in a country do not accept and respect the law,
the forces of law and order (e.g., the police and the judiciary) will
find it very difficult to perform their jobs. Within such countries,
ensuring compliance to the laws would be extremely costly, and the
government may be forced to devote a significant part of public
revenues to law-and-order activities. Such a process could force a
reduction in spending on other areas (e.g., health care, child
nutrition, and human capital development) that are critical to
economic growth and development. The second element of the rule
of law, then, is that the majority of citizens must voluntarily accept
and respect the law.201
In many of its rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court has contributed
significantly to the development of jurisprudence on the rule of law.
For example, in United States v. United Mine Workers,202 the U.S.
Supreme Court held:

199. Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 46
JUDGES’ J. 4, 6 (2007) (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in
LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3-21 (Robert J. Cunningham ed., 1979)
(emphasizing that this element is in every definition of the rule of law).
200. Stein, supra note 187, at 299.
201. See Margaret Levi, Tom R. Tyler & Audrey Sacks, The Reasons for
Compliance with Law, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS 70 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012)
(arguing, inter alia, and with respect to sub-Saharan Africa, that “voluntary
compliance with the law is influenced by individuals’ views of the government’s
legitimacy” and that “individuals’ conception of legitimacy depends significantly
on the government’s trustworthiness (including its perceived competence) and its
commitment to procedural justice”).
202. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (holding
that a trial court appropriately issued a restraining order to prevent a strike).
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In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping of
specialists or in the service of any special interest. There can be no free
society without law administered through an independent judiciary. If one
man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can.
That means first chaos, then tyranny.203

The various definitions of the rule of law found in the international
legal literature share the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements
found in U.S. v. United Mine Workers204 that “[t]here can be no free
society without law administered through an independent
judiciary.”205 As argued by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky,206 “An
independent judiciary is essential to the rule of law.”207 In stating that
“[t]he ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public or private, including the
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, . . . “,208 the United
Nations also acknowledges independence of the judiciary as a critical
element of the rule of law. The third element of the rule of law, then,
is judicial independence.
In any country, law can only function effectively and fully if
citizens “are aware of, understand, and appreciate the law.”209 Broadbased educational programs, specifically including those located in
primary and secondary schools, can help citizens understand and
appreciate the country’s standing laws and constitution. Government
should design these educational programs, however, to supplement
and not replace citizenship participation in constitutional design and
203. Id. at 312.
204. Id. (citing historical legal authority).
205. Id. (warning of the chaos that could arise should a man be allowed to
determine for himself what is law).
206. See Chemerinsky, supra note 199, at 6 (noting how frequently the rule of
law is not defined).
207. Id. at 8 (emphasizing this principle as “unassailable”).
208. See Robert H. Wagstaff, The Aftermath of Terrorism: Rule of Law Applies
to Detainees in U.S. and U.K., VA. LAW. MAG. Feb. 2010, at 32 (quoting U.N.
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616.23 (Aug. 2004) (adding that the
principle must also conform with international human rights).
209. See Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 990 (arguing that
school-based efforts should only supplement, not be the sole source where citizens
are educated).
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the creation of post-constitutional laws. The design and enactment of
laws in the post-constitutional society must be open and transparent,
providing citizens with the facilities to participate fully and
effectively. The laws, of course, must be applied “predictably and
uniformly”210 and not in a capricious and arbitrary manner. The
fourth and fifth elements of the rule of law are openness and
transparency, and predictability.
The ABA211 states that the rule of law developed in the United
States “around the belief that a primary purpose of the rule of law is
the protection of certain basic rights.”212 In similar fashion, many of
the people who participated in the decolonization of the European
colonies in Africa believed that independence would grant the former
colonies the right to rid themselves of European institutions,
subsequently replacing these institutions with laws and governing
processes developed by Africans.213 The popular hope was that the
post-independence constitutional order would adequately constrain
state custodians, effectively preventing them from engaging in
corruption, rent seeking, and other forms of political opportunism.
Perhaps, more importantly, the new laws were expected to guarantee
the protection of fundamental and human rights, as well as constrain
non-state actors so that they, too, could not infringe on the rights of
their fellow citizens, including especially those of women, and ethnic
and religious minorities.214 Hence, the sixth element of the rule of
210. See Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 194, at 5 (noting that
failure to apply the law thusly leads to unpredictable law).
211. Id.
212. Id. (stating that the United States was the first nation to write a document
that gives rights to its people and binds the government to those rights).
213. See John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in
Africa’s Political Adjustment in the “New” Global Era, in THE TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1, 2 (John
Mukum Mbaku & Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere eds., 2003) (emphasizing the
need for welfare policies, which were not fully developed under colonial rule).
214. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“Many Africans, especially the historically marginalized
and deprived (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities, and those forced to
live on the urban periphery), believed that independence was an opportunity to rid
themselves of not only the Europeans, but also of their laws and institutions and
then, develop and adopt, through a democratic process—a people-driven, bottomup, participatory, and transparent institutional reform process—institutional
arrangements based on their own values, aspirations, traditions, and customs.”).
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law is the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens.

D. THE RULE OF LAW AND STATE CAPTURE
State capture takes place when private business interests pay
bribes to legislators. The question to be answered then is how can the
existence of the rule of law prevent private interests from paying
bribes to legislators in order to capture the state? Suppose, for
example, that the governing process is undergirded by the rule of law
and citizens accept and respect the supremacy of law. Will that
minimize the chances that private business interests would capture
the state?
In his study of administrative tribunals and common-law courts in
the United States, John Dickinson215 concluded that the law is an
important check on the exercise of government power.216 The ability
of the people to effectively check on government activities is critical
to the minimization of corruption and, and by implication, state
capture. Many of the legal scholars and practitioners who have been
involved in rule-of-law issues have argued that for the rule of law to
function effectively and fully in a country, all of the country’s
citizens, including state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political
elites) must be subject to laws which were earlier agreed upon.217
Where such a legal regime exists, state custodians are not granted
wide discretion to “either make their own laws, or subvert existing
ones.”218 Governing elites—civil servants and politicians—like their
fellow citizens, must accept and respect the country’s laws, subject
themselves to these laws, and refrain from engaging in corruption,
rent seeking, and other forms of opportunism. Thus, where the law is
supreme, state capture is likely to be minimized.
215. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1921).

SUPREMACY OF LAW

216. See id. at 32 (arguing that the law is less a check on the citizen by the
government).
217. See, e.g., Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 964
(necessitating the promotion of wealth creation by marginalized groups); Stein,
supra note 188, at 301-02 (emphasizing that the law cannot be arbitrary or
inconsistent).
218. See Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 995 (emphasizing the
need for the law to apply to elites the same way it does to all other citizens).
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Nevertheless, as we have seen with countries, such as the United
States, which have strong and fully functioning rule-of-law systems,
private business interests can still attempt to corrupt political elites in
an effort to capture the state.219 However, the critical point is that
where the governing process is undergirded by the supremacy of law,
the efforts of private interests to corruptly capture the state are most
likely to be frustrated by the country’s democratic institutions. Thus,
for African countries that are interested in minimizing state capture,
the principle of the supremacy of law must be a central feature of
their governing processes.
Corruption control and hence, the minimization of state capture,
would be very difficult if a majority of citizens do not voluntarily
accept and respect the law. As has been argued by many legal
scholars and practitioners, “[i]t is very difficult for a nation to
maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not respect the law.”220 The
forces of law and order, which include the police and the judiciary,
are likely to find their jobs much easier to perform if the majority of
the citizens voluntarily accept and obey the law. Thus, voluntary
acceptance and respect of the law by a majority of citizens is critical
for the minimization of state capture.
But, how can African countries make certain that a majority of
their citizens voluntarily accept and respect the law? First, the laws
chosen must be “relevant to the lives of the people whose behaviors
the laws are expected to regulate, reflecting their values.”221 Second,
the laws must not be externally imposed on the people.222 They must
be those that “the people understand, respect, and are able and
willing to obey.”223 If the people make their own laws through a
participatory and inclusive process, they are likely to choose laws
219. See, e.g., L.H. LARUE, POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF THE
WATERGATE AFFAIR 2 (1988) (arguing, inter alia, that Watergate was as much
about a “breach of trust” as it was about the rule of law).
220. See Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 194, at 5 (declaring the
rule of law an essential element of the social contract).
221. See Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 1003 (noting how
citizens are more likely to accept and respect the laws when they had a say in their
design and implementation).
222. Id. (adding the necessity of the laws mirroring the citizens’ values to ensure
compliance).
223. Id.
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which are relevant to their lives and which they can obey.
The third way that an African country can garner support for its
laws and institutions is to make certain that the process by which the
people design and enact laws is open and transparent. While this
process will enhance and maximize participation, it would also help
citizens “know what the law is, understand the law, and make certain
that the law reflects their values and is relevant to their lives,
effectively enhancing compliance.”224 Of course, if the process
through which the laws are selected is open and transparent, citizens
will be able to understand why some laws have been selected instead
of others and why they must obey the laws.225
Finally, and most importantly, to make sure that citizens accept
and respect the laws, the laws must be relevant to citizens’ lives and
the issues that they face on a daily basis. It is very important that
citizens see the law as a tool that they can use to (i) deal with their
problems, including organizing their private lives; (ii) peacefully
resolve conflicts, including those arising from trade and other forms
of free exchange, and (iii) enhance their ability to engage in various
activities (e.g., start and run a business to create wealth) to improve
their quality of life. One of the most important problems that
governance systems in the African countries have encountered is that
most citizens see their laws and institutions as foreign impositions—
leftovers from the colonial period or in the case of post-independence
constitutions, documents that were simply “cobbled together by a
compliant constitution-making conference or convention, and then
adopted by a ‘controlled’ plebiscite.”226 Hence, it is important that
citizens take ownership of their laws and institutions so that they can
use them not only to organize their private lives and engage in
various activities to maximize their values, but also so that they can
adequately check on the activities of their governors and prevent the
type of corruption that leads to state capture.

224. Id. (encouraging citizens to participate in the political process).
225. See generally Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, supra note 194, at 5
(adding predictability as a necessary accompaniment).
226. See Victor T. Le Vine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West
Africa, 35 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 181, 188 (1997) (noting that many African leaders
legitimized their regimes through democratic constitutions).

2018]

RULE OF LAW, STATE CAPTURE AND HUMAN DEV'T

829

Judicial independence is very important for corruption control and
the minimization of state capture. The judiciary’s independence is a
multifaceted concept that requires that all officers of the judiciary be
granted “security of tenure,” “financial security,” and “institutional
independence.”227 Without an independent judiciary, it would not be
possible for an African country to deal effectively with grand
corruption and other behaviors that contribute to state capture.
Hence, African countries that seek to minimize chances of state
capture must make sure that they have judiciaries that are
independent of the other branches of government.228
Finally, openness and transparency are critical to the fight against
corruption and state capture. Gerring and Thacker argue that
“[o]penness and transparency, which we may understand as the
availability and accessibility of relevant information about the
functioning of the polity, is commonly associated with the absence of
corruption. 229 Since corruption, by definition, violates generally
accepted standards of behavior, greater transparency should
discourage corrupt actions, or at least facilitate appropriate
mechanisms of punishment (legal, administrative or electoral).”230
Openness and transparency in government communication are
important because they enhance the ability of citizens to fully
227. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III (demonstrating how the framers saw these
elements as critical to the independence of the judiciary); De Lange v. Smuts 1998
(3) SA 785 (CC) at para. 59 (S. Afr.) (holding that judicial independence . . . is
foundational to and indispensable for the discharge of the judicial function in a
constitutional democracy based on the rule of law” and endorsed the ruling of the
Canadian Supreme Court in Valente v. The Queen); Valente v. The Queen, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 673 ¶¶ IV, V, VI (Can.) (setting the standard for judiciary independence
in Canada).
228. This, of course, calls for a governing process that is undergirded by the
separation of powers with effective checks and balances. See generally ZOLTÁN
BALÁZS, THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: A DEFENSE xii (2016)
(arguing, inter alia, that the separation of powers is one of the most cherished
principles of constitutional government); James Fowkes & Charles M. Fombad,
Introduction, to SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1-9
(Charles M. Fombad ed., 2016) (presenting a series of essays that examine, inter
alia, the various efforts by Africa’s constitutional designers to separate the
different branches of government).
229. John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption:
The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 295 (2004).
230. Id. at 316.
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monitor and check on the activities of their government. In addition,
“transparency enhances the ability of an individual who is interested
in a public policy, or thinks or believes a decision might affect them,
to understand and appreciate how that decision was made or arrived
at and why.”231 This will, in turn, improve the chances that citizens
will voluntarily accept and obey the law, further improving
compliance.
In many countries in Africa, national governments are often not
fully representative of their diverse populations. Hence, ensuring that
public decisions are undertaken through an open and transparent
manner can minimize the distrust that many groups, especially the
ethnocultural groups that have historically been marginalized, have
for their governments. If a minority religious or ethnic group argues
that national policies are influenced by and benefit the few groups
that dominate the government, openness and transparency in policy
design would, at the very minimum, (1) offer opportunities for all
groups, including those who feel marginalized, to participate in
policy design; and (2) enhance the ability of these groups to witness
and understand how laws and other decisions affecting their lives are
made.232
In general, openness and transparency enhance the ability of
citizens to monitor and check on the activities of civil servants and
politicians, significantly contributing to accountability and a
subsequent reduction in corruption. Where corruption is minimized,
chances of state capture are reduced significantly.

V. STATE CAPTURE AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The main objective of private interests that capture the state is to
control the legislative process so that they can use it to enact laws
that enhance their ability to earn profits that are above and beyond
231. See Mbaku, Providing a Foundation, supra note 8, at 1012-13 (giving the
example of public policies on health and safety).
232. See Christina H. Drew & Timothy L. Nyerges, Transparency of
Environmental Decision Making: A Case Study of Soil Cleanup Inside the Hanford
100 Area, 7 J. RISK RES. 33, 36 (2004) (emphasizing, inter alia, openness and
transparency in public policy design and implementation).
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those available to them through traditional, competitive markets.
Once a state is captured, such a state’s efforts would be focused on
passing legislation that favors the private interests that have captured
it. Working with the civil servants and political elites that they have
captured, the consortium of private interests would entrench
themselves politically, weaken the state and its structures, set up
barriers to entry into various sectors of the economy, undermine the
ability of the government to promote competitive markets, and
effectively derail the state’s ability to provide all citizens with public
goods and services.
Private business interests invest significant resources to capture
the state because they believe that once they have control of the state,
they can monopolize the entire economy or major sectors of it,
ultimately earning above normal rates of return on investment.
Through this process, they can distort economic incentives and
discourage investment in productivity-enhancing technologies, and
prevent efforts by the government to promote inclusive economic
growth and development.
First, in a captured state, economic development is not likely to be
a policy priority.233 For example, the private interests that have
captured the state may not be interested in maintaining the type of
tax system that maximizes the revenues that the government needs to
implement public policies (e.g., investment in education—especially
at the primary and secondary levels, infrastructure, child nutrition,
health care, and prenatal care for pregnant women) that promote
human development. The business interests may, instead, prefer
either extremely low tax rates or a tax system that allows them to
evade paying taxes altogether.
Second, the business interests that have captured the state may
make possible the passage of legislation that creates barriers to entry
into the economy, making the latter extremely less competitive. In
the process, the economy may remain locked into an inferior
equilibrium, one in which the only beneficiaries are the private
233. See John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and
Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
295, 295, 297 (2004) (emphasizing, rather, the role of sovereignty and the
composition of the executive).
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interests that have captured the state. Foreign investment which
brings necessary technology, improves productive efficiency, and
enhances the country’s ability to become globally competitive, is
prevented from entering the economy. A country with a captured
state can remain trapped in a state of underdevelopment that is
characterized by extremely high levels of poverty and deprivation.
Nevertheless, while the majority of the people in these economies
may remain trapped in poverty, civil servants, politicians, and the
business interests that have captured them can actually enjoy a
significantly high standard of living.
In captured states, private business interests can manipulate public
responses to market failure to minimize their production costs and
enhance their ability to garner non-competitive profits. For example,
one of the functions of a government is to address market failure
with respect to environmental pollution (which includes water, land,
and air pollution) by taxation and other policies that either (1)
directly increase the opportunity cost to the polluter; or (2) provide
necessary resources for cleanups; or (3) subsidize polluters to
prevent them from polluting. Using one or a combination of these
methods, the government can deal effectively with pollution and
improve, for example, the quality of air and water available to
citizens.
However, where the state is captured by private business interests,
the government may actually ignore enacting necessary legislation
which provides legal tools to fight pollution. This enhances the
ability of polluting businesses to earn non-competitive profits.
Meanwhile, citizens, especially those belonging to groups that are
not politically connected, will be burdened by the costs of the
pollution.234 During military rule in Nigeria, for example, private
mining interests were able to collude with the government and
effectively frustrate any efforts to control pollution in the Niger Delta
region of the country.235 The result has been degradation of land, air
234. See generally DANIEL A. OMOWEH, SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, THE STATE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA: A
STUDY IN ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION (2005) (examining, inter alia, the
failure of the Nigerian state to prevent ecosystem degradation in the Niger Delta
region of Nigeria).
235. See id. at 1 (explaining how Shell has produced crude oil in the Delta for
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and water quality in the Niger Delta, significant increases in poverty,
and serious damage to the health of the people.236
Since public policy in captured states is usually geared towards
maximizing the economic interests of the private businesses that
have captured the state, there is likely to be a concentration of wealth
in the hands of a few enterprise owners and the state custodians who
“work” for them. This effectively deprives the population writ large
of access to resources for development. This situation could lead to
significant deterioration in the quality of life and seriously
undermine government efforts to promote poverty alleviation and
human development.
In any country, public policy is the purview of the government—
the government, working with the help of the people, designs and
implements policies to enhance national development. In doing so,
the government must make the welfare of the people the epicenter of
public policy. Nevertheless, when the state is captured by private
business interests, the state loses its ability to function for the best
interests of its people. State agents (i.e., civil servants and
politicians), whose job it is to serve the interests of the principal (i.e.,
the people), may engage in self-dealing to maximize their own
interests and those of their benefactors. Because state capture creates
incentives for custodians of the state to act opportunistically, it is
antithetical to national development.
Finally, because state capture transfers the legislative function to
non-elected individuals,237 any efforts by citizens to deepen and
institutionalize democracy are likely to be frustrated by enterprise
owners who see democracy as a constraint to their economic
ambitions. Hence, once a private interest captures the state, it might
become difficult to reverse course because those in control of the
structures of the state would make it very difficult for citizens to
engage in the types of institutional reforms that restore national
institutions and improve their democratic character.

almost fifty years).
236. See id. (noting that Shell would dump untreated waste into the land and
swamps, spill oil without cleanup, and flare the oil).
237. That is, the private business interests that invest in state capture.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal and social science literature has defined state capture as
a process where private operatives (e.g., private businesses) use
corrupt means (e.g., the payment of bribes to civil servants and
politicians) to either significantly influence or take control of the
public policy process in a country. Once private interests appropriate
state institutions, these private interests may not only have significant
impact on public policy outcomes but may also significantly
influence the making of the country’s laws.
Although state capture can produce many outcomes, the most
important are: (1) the interests of the people are substituted for those
of the captors (that is, the actors who have successfully captured the
state)—the state may, henceforth, devote its efforts to serving the
needs of the captors instead of providing people with public goods
and services; (2) the legislative process may no longer be within the
purview of the people’s elected representatives; instead, the captors
may become de facto legislators; (3) public policies would no longer
reflect national priorities. They are instead likely to reflect the
interests of the captors—in fact, the government may eventually
abandon national political and economic priorities in favor of those
favored by the captors; (4) there is likely to be a slow, but steady,
deterioration of the country’s institutions; (5) there would be a
preference for opacity in government communication, instead of
openness and transparency; (6) there would most likely be a failure
of the government to be accountable to the constitution and the
people; and (7) there is likely to be a general deterioration in the
legal system.
In addition to forcing a state to abandon its constitutional
functions, which include maintaining law and order and providing
other necessary public goods and services, state capture may
significantly increase the level of government impunity. This is
likely to include the abuse of citizens’ rights, especially those of
historically marginalized groups (e.g., women, girls, and religious
and ethnic minorities). In addition, one may also see an increased
deterioration in economic competitiveness, as well as in the
country’s governing structures.
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But how can a state extricate itself from this economic and
political quagmire? In the case of South Africa, a country with a very
progressive constitution and relatively effective institutions, the
solution lies in making certain that those institutions perform their
jobs. The process has already begun—with the help of civil society
and its organizations (e.g., the independent press), the Public
Protector has already completed her investigation and released the
results. It is now left to other institutions to follow the country’s laws
and take the process to its natural conclusion.238
An examination of state capture in South Africa shows that any
state, regardless of how robust its institutions are, is still susceptible
to state capture. However, as we have seen in the case of South
Africa, the country’s strong and independent institutions, particularly
its independent press, can expose efforts to capture the state and pave
the way for further investigation and prosecution by the state’s other
democratic institutions (e.g., the independent judiciary). While there
are some suggestions that the National Prosecuting Authority and the
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) have been
compromised and hence, cannot be relied upon to take the necessary
remedial actions recommended by the Public Protector’s report, it is
important to note that the judiciary remains independent and quite
capable of taking the necessary legal action in bringing the matter to
a conclusion. The hope is that South Africa’s institutions will deal
fully and effectively with the Gupta Affair in order to minimize its
impact on the country’s democracy and democratic institutions.
With respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo and other
countries that do not have effective and fully functioning laws and
institutions, the recommendation is that they undertake
comprehensive institutional reforms to provide, first, a constitution
that ensures the separation of powers with effective checks and
balances, and second, a governing process that is capable of
enforcing all constitutional provisions. This can only be
accomplished through engagement in robust, inclusive and
participatory institutional reforms to totally transform the country’s
238. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 112 (“If [the Public Protector] is of the opinion
that the facts disclose the commission of an offence by any person, to bring the
matter to the notice of the relevant authority charged with prosecutions.”).

836

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:4

institutional arrangements and provide the people with a governing
process that is undergirded by a true separation of powers with
effective checks and balances.
The lesson for South Africa and other African countries is that
every state, no matter the nature of its institutions is vulnerable to
capture. Nevertheless, countries whose governing processes are
undergirded by a separation of powers with effective checks and
balances (e.g., independent judiciary, a robust civil society, and an
independent press) are more likely to be able to deal fully and
effectively with any efforts to capture the state.

